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Intestacy statutes provide for the disposition of a decedent's
probate property when the decedent dies without a valid will.1
Intestacy statutes create, in effect, a statutory will-a will in
which the government, rather than the individual, determines the
dispositive terms.2
An analysis of intestacy law must begin with the recognition
that an intestacy statute cannot work equally well for every
potential decedent. Indeed, developing an intestacy statute that
will meet the needs or wishes of all persons is both unnecessary
and impossible. There are too many variations on what decedents
want, too many family situations to consider and too many special
circumstances surrounding individual decedents. An intestacy
statute can serve as a default rule, but a person whose wishes do
not fit the default rule must execute a will.3 Any adult with
*Assistant Professor of Law, University of Oregon. The author thanks
David M. English, Mary Louise Fellows, Alexander B. Murphy, Nancy E. Shurtz, E.
Gary Spitko and Dominick Vetri for extremely helpful comments on this Article;
Susanna Brennan, Daniel P. McGee and Maria Carnevale for research assistance;
and Karen Spradling for administrative and secretarial support.
1. Intestacy statutes only govern the disposition of property held in the
decedent's name alone. See JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS,
TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 36-39 (5th ed. 1995). The probate process administers and
distributes a decedents property either pursuant to the decedent's will or by
intestacy. See id. Property held in a way that avoids probate-in trust, in joint
tenancy or subject to a beneficiary designation-will pass pursuant to the trust
document, operation of law or contract. See id.
2. Cf. Gerry W. Beyer, Statutoty Fill-in Will Forms-The First Decade:
Theoretical Constructs and Empirical Findings, 72 OR. L. REV. 769, 774 (1993)
(stating that statutory wills have many benefits, but that improvements could be
made).
3. See Lawrence W. Waggoner, Marital Property Rights in TD'ansition, 59 Mo.
L. REV. 21, 29 (1994) (Stating:
No intestacy regime can hope to be 'suitable' for every person who dies
intestate. People whose individuated intention differs from common
intention must assume the responsibility of making a will; otherwise, their
property will be distributed, by default, according to common intention or,
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adequate mental capacity4 can opt out of the intestacy statute
either by executing a will or by holding title to property in a
manner that provides for the transfer of title at death by means
other than the probate system.5 If a person determines that the
applicable intestacy statute will not appropriately carry out his or
her testamentary wishes, the person has alternatives to subjecting
disposition of his or her property to the statutory formula. 6
Given that a one-size-fits-all intestacy statute is impossible
and that property owners can use a will to personalize their
dispositive scheme, what then should intestacy statutes seek to
do? Intestacy statutes have, since the first adoption of such
statutes in this country, given a decedent's property to those
family members closest to the decedent. Early statutes focused on
bloodline,7 whereas revisions in the 1980s in many states
increased the share going to a surviving spouse.8 Current statutes
create a hierarchy of intestate takers based on proximity to the
decedent. For takers other than the surviving spouse, the statutes
determine proximity based on ties of blood or adoption.9 The
more accurately, according to intention as attributed to them by the state
legislature.).
4. Mental capacity for purposes of executing a will is low. See DUKEMINIER &
JOHANSON, supra note 1, at 149 (explaining that the requirements are minimal and
that the decedent need only know the nature and extent of his or her property, the
natural objects of his or her bounty, the disposition he or she is making and how
these elements relate).
5. Property may be transferred at death outside the probate system. See
DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 1, at 36-37. Property held in trusts, in joint
tenancy, in tenancy by the entirety and property paid to a designated beneficiary
under a life insurance policy or a pension plan, will all be transferred without going
through the probate system. See id.
6. Of course, many people who should avail themselves of the opportunity to
execute a will, fail to do so. See infra text accompanying notes 74-81.
7. See MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW 238-40
(1989).
8. A study of testamentary wishes published in 1978 provided empirical
evidence that a married person whose children were all children of that marriage
would prefer to leave the entire estate to his or her spouse, with the assumption
that the spouse would use the property for the benefit of the children, rather than
to leave one-half of the property directly to the children. See Mary Louise Fellows
et al., Public Attitudes About Property Distribution at Death and Intestate
Succession Laws in the United States, 1978 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 319, 356 n.127.
A number of states changed their intestacy statutes to provide that the estate
would go to the surviving spouse unless the decedent left children who were not
children of the surviving spouse. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 112.025 (1999). But see
755 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/2-1(a) (West 1992) (distributing one-half of the estate to
the surviving spouse and one-half of the estate to the decedent's children).
9. Proximity varies under the statutes. For example, in most states siblings of
the whole-blood share equally with siblings of the half-blood, see, e.g., OR. REV.
STAT. § 112.095 (1999), but in a few states relatives of the half-blood take only a
half share, see, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-2 (Michie 1999), and in a few states the
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statutes do not take into consideration whether the decedent had
an ongoing relationship with the heir or even knew the heir.
Broadly speaking, the goal behind intestacy statutes is to
give the decedent's property to the decedent's family.10 Where the
decedent's family consists of a spouse and the decedent's legal 1"
children, the intestacy statute distributes the decedent's property
to those the decedent most probably thought of as his or her
closest family members. In other words, the statute works for
many decedents, most likely giving the decedent's property to the
persons the decedent prefers to benefit. However, this pattern
does not fit the needs of all American families. Although
individuals can choose a different dispositive plan by executing a
will, many will fail to do so and will die intestate.1 2
half-blood relative receives a share only if there are no whole-blood relatives of the
same degree, see, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 91-1-5 (1999). Remote relatives may
receive a share of the estate based on the degree of relationship to the decedent as
determined by reference to a table of consanguinity. Under such statutes a first
cousin twice removed is of the same degree and will receive the same share as a
second cousin. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-204 (Michie 1999); CAL. PROB.
CODE § 240 (West 1997-98); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-439 (1999). In other states,
statutes determine the intestate shares of remote relatives by reference to the
decedent's ancestors, one generation at a time. That is, the intestate estate of a
decedent with no spouse or descendants goes first to the decedent's parents, then to
their descendants, then to grandparents, then to the grandparents' descendants,
then to great-grandparents, then to their descendants, and so on until an heir is
found. A first cousin twice removed (a descendant of the decedent's grandparents)
would take before a second cousin (a descendant of the decedent's great-
grandparents). See, e.g., 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/2-1 (West 1998); MO. REV. STAT.
§ 474.010 (1999). In all of these statutes, the degree of relationship based on blood
or adoption determines the share without regard to whether the decedent actually
had a personal relationship with the relative. See DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra
note 4, at 85-87.
10. See Fellows et al., supra note 8, at 324.
11. In this Article, "legal" child will refer to a child by blood or adoption. Laws
vary in their definition of "child," but most laws, including intestacy statutes,
define child as having a biological--established pursuant to paternity laws, if
necessary---or adoptive connection to the parent. Even in cases in which a statute
does not define parent or child, a court may fall back on the idea that the
relationship between a parent and child must be biological or adoptive to be legal.
See, e.g., Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991); infra text
accompanying notes 313-325.
12. See Gerry W. Beyer, supra note 2, at 841 n.154 (indicating that in a small
sample of 51 persons, 37% had wills); Fellows et al., supra note 8, at 338 (stating
that over 45% of the overall sample had a will, ranging from 36.5% in
Massachusetts to 60.7% in Ohio); Mary Louise Fellows et al., An Empirical Study
of the Illinois Statutory Estate Plan, 1976 LAW FORUM 717, 718 n.3; Joel R.
Glucksman, Intestate Succession in New Jersey: Does it Conform to Popular
Expectations?, 12 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 253 (1975-76) (reporting that of 2,556
decedents in 1971, 47% died with a will, 12% had a probate estate administered
under the intestacy laws, and 41% used an intestate affidavit or the estate was
unprobated); Contemporary Studies Project, A Comparison of Iowans' Dispositive
Preferences with Selected Provisions Of the Iowa and Uniform Probate Codes, 63
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The family structure in the United States has changed
dramatically.13  Stepfamilies, blended families, unmarried
heterosexual and gay and lesbian cohabitants with or without
children-many persons now live in families that no longer fit the
Cleaver family norm.14
Some areas of the law address these new families. In many
states, laws such as wrongful death statutes, workers
compensation laws, custody and visitation statutes and housing
statutes now include persons beyond legally married spouses and
legal children. 15 The family members covered by the statutes vary
from statute to statute, but in each case the statute creates
categories that make sense given that statute's purpose in
protecting "family." 16
Legislatures have been reluctant to expand the definition of
family for purposes of intestacy. Except for a modification in
California's intestacy statute that includes stepchildren under
very limited circumstances 17 and a recent change in Hawaii that
IOWA L. REV. 1041, 1070 (1978) [hereinafter Iowa Study] (reporting that of the
3,122 probate files reviewed, 72% of the decedents died testate; of the 94 survivors
interviewed, 66% had a will; and of the 600 random interviews, 49% of the
respondents had a will). Studies based on probate records cannot reveal whether
other decedents with no probate estates died without assets or died with property
transferred after death by nonprobate means.
13. Statistical evidence marks the changes, but the changes are probably even
more dramatic than the available statistics suggest. See infra text accompanying
notes 178-195.
14. Leave It to Beaver, a television show depicting the Cleaver family as a
"typical" American family consisting of a mother, father and two kids, is a favorite
stereotype of the nuclear family. See, e.g., WAGGONER ET AL., FAMILY PROPERTY
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS ON WILLS, TRUSTS, AND FUTURE INTERESTS 79 (2d ed.
1997) ("The Changing American Family-From 'Leave It To Beaver' to 'The Brady
Bunch"'); Martha Minow, Redefining Families: Who's In and Who's Out, 62 COLO.
L. REV. 269, 273 (1991). See also David D. Haddock & Daniel D. Polsby, Family as
a Rational Classification, 74 WASH U. L.Q. 15, 15 (1996) (suggesting that the
negative connotations attached to Beaver's family in other articles are unfair).
15. See infra text accompanying notes 289-379.
16. At the same time that some laws have expanded to include more family
members, discrimination based on family relationships is still legal in many
contexts, including employment, housing, lending, education and public
accommodation. See Mary Louise Fellows et al., Committed Partners and
Inheritance An Empirical Study, 16 LAw & INEQ. J. 1, 5 n.14 (1998) (citing statutes
in only eight states-California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
New Jersey, Vermont, Wisconsin and the District of Columbia-that prohibit
discrimination based on sexual orientation). Nevada, New Hampshire and Rhode
Island have recently enacted statutes prohibiting discrimination based on sexual
orientation. See NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 281.370, 338.125, 610.010-610.185, 613.310-
613.405 (1999); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 21:49, 21-4:42, 21-1:52, 21-4:58,151:21,
354-A:1 to 354-A:17, 354-B:1 (1999); R.I. GEN. LAwS §§ 23-17.16-2, 28-5-2 to 28-5.1-
9, 34-37-2 to 34-37-5.4 (1999).
17. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6454 (West 1991 & Supp. 1999); see infra text
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provides an intestate share for a person registered as the
decedent's "reciprocal beneficiary,"' 8 intestacy laws still reflect the
nuclear family norm. As yet there are few ideas about how to
effectuate change without putting too much discretion for
determining the appropriate beneficiaries into the hands of the
probate judges. Lawmakers need an approach that takes seriously
the changing composition of American families and that steers a
course between the formal and functional approaches to defining
family members, while limiting the degree of discretion held by the
court.
Laws formally define family when the laws create a definition
of family based on status, either a blood relationship or a legally
recognized procedure that creates a link between the family
members who are parties to the procedure.1 9 In general, under
current law either marriage or adoption creates this formal, legal
link.20 Thus, intestacy laws define family as persons related by
blood, marriage or adoption.
A functional definition of family instead tries to determine
what a family does, what functions family members perform for
each other and what relationships family members have with each
other.2' The definition attempts to include as family members
those who function as family members, those for whom close,
loving, caring and nurturing family relationships exist. Some
areas of the law have incorporated elements of a functional
accompanying notes 376-380.
18. HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 572C-1-572C-7 (1998); see infra text accompanying
notes 213-218.
19. Marriage creates rights and obligations as between the husband and wife,
but not with respect to their children. Children of one spouse do not automatically
become children of the other spouse through the marriage. See Susan F. Koffnan,
Stepparent Adoption: A comparative Analysis of Laws and Policies in England and
the United States, 7 B.C. INT'L & COMP. LAW REV. 469, 470 (1984) ("Marrying
someone with children-becoming a stepparent-confers neither parental rights nor
duties. To many stepparents, adoption of the stepchild seems the only way to
establish parental standing.") (footnote omitted).
20. Hawaii has added a new formal link-registration of a "reciprocal
beneficiary relationship"-that creates legal rights, including intestacy rights,
between the two persons who register their relationship. HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 572C-
1 to 572C-7 (1998); see also infra text accompanying notes 226-232. Partnership
registration statutes in a growing number of cities enable persons to establish a
formal link for employee benefits purposes. See infra note 225.
21. See Minow, supra note 14, at 270 (stating that a group of people function as
a family when they "share affection and resources, think of one another as family
members and present themselves as such to neighbors and others"); Mary Patricia
Treuthart, Adopting a More Realistic Definition of "Family," 26 GONZ. L. REV. 91,
99 (1990) (defining family as "a community, which: (1) provides financial and
emotional support to the members, (2) involves interdependence and commitment,
and (3) allows transcendence of self-interest to an unlimited degree").
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definition of family, usually combined with a formal definition.
For example, in determining visitation rights with respect to
children, family law in many states uses the concept of in loco
parentis to identify a family relationship worthy of protection.2 2 A
person acting in loco parentis is someone not related by blood or
adoption to the child but who acts as a parent to the child.23 A
child may have a biological or adoptive parent and also a
stepparent, grandparent or other adult whom the law will regard,
at least for some purposes, as a parent. 24
Assuming that some change in the way intestacy laws define
family is necessary, what is the best approach? In considering this
question, this Article first reviews the policy considerations behind
intestacy statutes and the changes that are occurring in American
families. The Article examines recent legal responses to the
demographic changes, first those that take a formal approach and
then those that rely on a functional approach. Noting the growing
use of a functional definition of family in other areas of the law,
the Article asserts that attempts to squeeze new family members
into the existing framework of intestacy laws have not worked
well. The Article critiques the creation of intestate shares for
reciprocal beneficiaries under Hawaii law and for stepchildren
under California law, and then analyzes proposed modifications to
the California statute and a proposal to create an intestate share
for de facto partners. The Article concludes with a proposal for a
statute that, for intestacy purposes, expands the definition of
parent and child to include a person who can establish that a
parent-child relationship existed between that person and the
decedent.25
I. The Purposes of Intestacy Statutes
Intestacy statutes are necessary because many Americans do
not have valid wills when they die.2 6 In order to determine
whether current intestacy statutes adequately carry out the
purposes behind those statutes, this Article examines the extent of
the role intestacy statutes play, looking at which groups of people
22. See MARGARET M. MAHONEY, STEPFAMILIES & THE LAW 133-37 (1994)
(describing the use of the in loco parentis concept and the best interests of the child
standard in providing stepparent visitation). See also infra text accompanying
notes 289-300.
23. See MAHONEY, supra note 22, at 16-17.
24. See infra text accompanying notes 289-300.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 482-Error! Bookmark not defined..
26. See supra note 12.
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are more likely to die intestate and the rationales given for
intestacy statutes.
A. The Rationales for Intestacy Statutes
Scholars have identified a number of goals for intestacy laws.
These goals fall into two categories. One category focuses on the
interests of the individual property owner, whereas the other
category focuses on societal interests.27
1. Decedent's Intent
The most commonly identified goal of intestacy statutes is to
create a dispositive scheme that will carry out the probable intent
of most testators. 28 To the extent possible, the statute should
27. All goals can be considered societal goals since a goal that benefits the
individual decedent or the decedent's family indirectly, or even directly, benefits
society.
28. The General Comment to the 1990 Uniform Probate Code (UPC), for
example, explains that the pre-1990 UPC "was designed to provide suitable rules
for the person of modest means who relies on the estate plan provided by law."
UNIF. PROBATE CODE art. II, pt. 1, gen. cmt. (1993). The 1990 revisions seek to
further that purpose, and also to bring the sections "into line with developing
public policy." Id. See also WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 14, at 33 (explaining that
the decedent's intention is one rationale for intestacy laws while identifying several
other goals); Lawrence H. Averill, Jr., An Eclectic History and Analysis of the 1990
Uniform Probate Code, 55 ALB. L. REV. 891, 912 (1992) (discussing two generally
accepted policies espoused by the 1990 Uniform Probate Code, namely, that
succession law should reflect the desires of the typical person with regard to
protecting expressions of desire and anticipating situations where those
expressions are inadequately presented); Allison Dunham, The Method, Process
and Frequency of Wealth Transmission at Death, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 241, 247-42
(1962-63) (explaining that the use of quantitative research to determine what
persons who do not have wills would most likely want could be useful for legislative
reform to effectuate decedent's intent); E. Gary Spitko, The Expressive Function of
Succession Law and the Merits of Non-Marital Inclusion, 41 ARIZ. L. REV 1063,
1068 (1999) ("Succession law generally places donative freedom at the apex of its
hierarchy of values."). See also Mary Louise Fellows, Concealing Legislative
Reform in the Common-Law Tradition: The Advancements Doctrine and the
Uniform Probate Code, 37 VAND. L. REV. 671, 707 (1984) (referring to what
intestacy statutes should do); Fellows et al., supra note 8, at 327-28 (arguing that if
an intestacy statute does not conform to the likely wishes of an intestate decedent,
then the statute "creates a trap for the ignorant or misinformed"); Iowa Study,
supra note 12, at 1043 (stating that "furthering the perceived intent of the
intestate, efficiently distributing the property of the intestate, satisfying all
creditor claimants of the estate, and assuring that the intestate's spouse and
dependent heirs do not become wards of the state" are all goals of intestacy statutes
but that furthering the intent of the decedent has become the primary goal.); John
T. Gaubatz, Notes Toward a Truly Modern Wills Act, 31 UNIV. OF MIAMI L. REV.
497, 501 (1977) ('It is generally agreed that it is the purpose of such [succession]
laws to give effect, subject to the constraints of other public policies, to the wishes
of the decedent while providing for the well-being of his family."). Professor
Gaubatz draws on Professor Ely, and lists as the goals of succession laws, "(1)
2000]
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distribute the property to the persons the decedent would have
chosen to receive the property if the decedent were making the
decision. Although a dispositive scheme that will work for every
testator is impossible, the goal of a statute should be to meet the
needs and wishes of as many persons as possible. 29
This goal of carrying out the presumed intent of most
decedents follows from the concept of private property, a concept
at the heart of American property law.30 Connected to the idea
that individuals can own and control property, separate and apart
from ownership by the family unit or other social unit, is the idea
that an individual property owner should be able to control the
disposition of the property at his or her death.31 While freedom of
testation is not unlimited, 32 it continues to be substantial. The
continuation of the regime of private property as dominant in the social order; (2)
effectuation of the wishes of the individual; (3) provision for the well-being of the
family; and (4) provision for the well-being of society." Id. (citing RICHARD T. ELY,
PROPERTY AND CONTRACT IN THEIR RELATION TO THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH
425-34 (1914)). The first of these goals reflects the need to provide for a means to
transfer private property on death, if a system of private property is to be
perpetuated. See also Waggoner, supra note 3, at 29 ("[Appropriate intestate
shares for surviving spouses] or any other consideration of spousal rights in
intestacy must begin with the assumption that intestacy laws should reflect
common' intention.").
29. Beginning an analysis of intestacy with the decedent's intent, assumes, of
course, that the property is the decedent's to control. An intestacy statute governs
property that the decedent could distribute by will A preliminary consideration is
whether the decedent should, in fact, control the disposition of the property. That
is, do family members - a spouse or children - have competing interests in the
property? Should the title control ownership of the property or should property law
give rights in the property to a spouse or to children? As Lawrence Waggoner has
written, "Intestacy laws build upon the rules that allocate original ownership." See
Waggoner, supra note 3, at 27. If future property laws provide for ownership by the
marital unit rather than the individual (already the case in community property
states) or by the family unit rather than the individual, then the intestacy statutes
may change accordingly.
30. For an interesting historical discussion of the goals of inheritance law (both
testate and intestate), see Gaubatz, supra note 28, at 501-17. Professor Gaubatz
comments that freedom of testation is "[i]mplicit in the definition of private
property in many minds." Id. at 503. See also Lawrence M. Friedman, The Law of
the Living, The Law of the Dead: Property, Succession, and Society, 1966 WISC. L.
REV. 340, 340 (explaining that fields of law, including the law of succession which
"governs the orderly transfer of economic interests from generation to generation,"
are "concerned in some way or other with reproducing social values in succeeding
generations").
31. See Gaubatz, supra note 28, at 502.
32. The United States Constitution does not protect freedom of testation
absolutely. See Babbitt v. Youpee, 519 U.S. 234, 244 (1997) (holding amended
section 207 of the Indian Land Consolidation Act invalid because it "severely
restricts the right of an individual to direct the descent of his property"); Hodel v.
Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 717 (1987) ("In holding that complete abolition of beth the
descent and devise of a particular class of property may be taking, we reaffirm the
continuing vitality of the long line of cases recognizing the States', and where
[Vol. 18:1
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ability to rely on an intestacy statute for distribution of property
may be related to the idea of freedom of testation.33
2. Benefits to Society
Although many sources cite the decedent's intent as the
primary goal of intestacy laws, commentators have also identified
goals that benefit society more broadly. 34 Many societal goals
derive from a concern with support, both economic and otherwise,
of the decedent's family.35  Other societal goals include
"continuation of the regime of private property as dominant in the
social order,"36 avoiding complicated property titles and excessive
subdivision of property, 37  encouraging the accumulation of
wealth,38 providing for ease of administration 39 and maintaining
respect for the legal system.40
appropriate, the United States', broad authority to adjust the rules governing the
descent and devise of property .... ); Irving Trust Co. v. Day, 314 U.S. 556, 562
(1942) ("Rights of succession to the property of a deceased, whether by will or by
intestacy, are of statutory creation, and the dead hand rules succession only by
sufferance."). Restrictions on freedom of testation include spousal elective share
rights, transfer taxes and pretermitted child statutes. See, e.g., WAGGONER ET AL.,
supra note 14.
33. See Fellows et al., supra note 8, at 323 (internal citation omitted)
("Testamentary freedom should include the right not to have to execute a will in
order to have accumulated wealth pass to natural objects of the decedent's
bounty."); see also Friedman, supra note 30, at 355 ("Intestacy laws can even be
analyzed as an extension of the principle of free disposition of property at death.").
Friedman continues, however, that "[i]ntestacy is in fact mostly 'chosen' only by
default. It is a statutory plan adopted by government and imposed for social rather
than individualistic reasons .... Id.
34. Many commentators discuss the policies behind succession laws generally,
including laws that apply to testamentary transfers as well as to intestate
distribution. While the discussion will cite from some of these works for their
general principles, the analysis will focus on the goals of intestacy laws. See infra
text accompanying notes 35-55.
35. See, e.g., Fellows et al., supra note 8, at 324 (listing protection of dependent
family members and promotion of the nuclear family as goals of intestacy statutes);
see also infra text accompanying notes 47-55.
36. See Gaubautz, supra note 28, at 501 (listing several goals of succession
laws).
37. See id.
38. See Fellows et al., supra note 8, at 324.
39. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE art. II, pt. 2, gen. cmt. (1993) ("[E]ase of
administration and predictability of result are prized features of the probate
system .... "); Gaubatz, supra note 28, at 514 (explaining that simplicity in the
administration of estates benefits both society and the heirs of the decedent); Iowa
Study, supra note 12, at 1046 (listing cost-effectiveness and administrative
manageability of the statute as one of several factors in considering intestacy
reform); Albert H. Qosterhoff, Succession Law in the Antipodes: Proposals for
Reform in New Zealand, 16 EST. & TR. J. 230, 232 (1997).
40. See Gaubatz, supra note 28, at 516 (explaining that, to maintain respect,
any law must be responsive to the demands of the society it serves and must serve
2000]
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Of all of these goals, concerns for the family are paramount.
For centuries succession laws in Anglo-American law have
provided for family members. John Gaubatz describes this
concern for the interests of family members in early Roman law,
old Germanic law and early English law, and concludes that "[t]his
favoring of family in succession law has been nearly constant
throughout history."41
Although family interests often take priority, Lawrence
Friedman has pointed to the long-standing tension in succession
laws between an economic principle (testamentary freedom) and a
social principle (succession within the family).42 Indeed, other
than taxation, the legal restrictions on testamentary freedom
reflect the social principle Professor Friedman identified. The
restrictions benefit a decedent's spouse or children by restricting
the decedent's ability to disinherit his or her spouse43 and by
making assumptions about testamentary intent in favor of the
spouse or children. 44
The tension between testamentary freedom and succession
within the family does not exist when a decedent dies intestate
because the decedent has not exercised the available testamentary
freedom. 45 Therefore, the presumed intent of the decedent may
parallel the social principle of providing for family members.
Intestacy statutes can support families by facilitating the transfer
of wealth among family members. The statutes also can reduce
the possibility of disputes among surviving family members.
Constructing a statute that will be considered fair by all those who
knew the decedent may lessen family disharmony and minimize
disputes among surviving family members and others who have an
as a moderator of societal reactions). See also infra text accompanying note 46
(discussing the goal of limiting disputes).
41. See Gaubatz, supra note 28, at 507.
42. See Friedman, supra note 30, at 378.
43. Elective share statutes, community property, homestead rights and family
allowances protect a surviving spouse from disinheritance. See generally GLENDON,
supra note 7, at 244-46.
44. For example, pretermitted heir statutes provide a share for a child born to
the testator after the testator executed his or her will under the assumption that
the testator would have provided a share for the child if the child had been alive.
See DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 4, at 551 ("[A] number of doctrines have
been flexibly used to protect children.").
45. See RICHARD R. POWELL & PATRICK J. ROHAN, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY
§ 90.02[3] (1997) ("[Certain societal goals can be accomplished through an
intestacy scheme. These goals may include support for family members;
encouragement of the nuclear family by giving property to those persons who
comprise the nuclear family; and the encouragement of wealth accumulation.").
[Vol. 18:1
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interest in the decedent's estate.46
Intestacy statutes also provide support for dependent family
members. 47 Jeremy Bentham describes care for dependents as the
first of three goals for laws of succession. 48 Bentham suggests that
since the facts necessary to establish dependence are difficult (or
awkward) to prove, "[tjhe share which each survivor was
accustomed to enjoy in the property of the deceased may be
presumed from the degree of affection which ought to have
subsisted between them; and this degree of affection may be
presumed from nearness of relationship.... "49 Thus, the
relationship of spouse or child serves as shorthand for a statute
seeking to provide "for the subsistence of the rising generation,"5°
and a goal of providing support for a decedent's dependents is
inextricably intertwined with provisions for the family.51 This goal
of providing for dependents is a driving concern behind the system
of testator's family maintenance in force in Australia, Canada,
England and New Zealand. 52
In addition to providing for family members, limiting
disputes and supporting dependents, a goal of supporting the
family as a positive societal institution exists. Although not as
46. See WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 14, at 32-34; Susan N. Gary, Mediation
and the Elderly: Using Mediation to Resolve Probate Disputes over Guardianship
and Inheritance, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 397, 415-21 (1997).
47. Issues of support surface in probate codes in connection with homestead
provisions and family allowances. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-401
(Homestead Allowance), 2-402 (Exempt Property), and 2-403 (Family Allowance)
(1998). Society's concern that its members have adequate resources may also be
appropriately considered in thinking about intestacy statutes.
48. See WAGGONER ET AL., FAMILY PROPERTY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS ON
WILLS, TRUSTS, AND FUTURE INTERESTS 38 (1991) (citing J. BENTHAM, THE THEORY
OF LEGISLATION 177-86 (C.K Ogden ed. 1931), which lists the objects a legislator
should consider in framing a law of succession as "1st, Provision for the subsistence




51. See Gaubatz, supra note 28, at 506-10 (listing "providing for the family" as
one of several primary goals of inheritance law, and "providing for the needy,"
defined to include family members, charity and the government, as a subgoal of the
goal of "providing for society"); see also Friedman, supra note 30, at 358 ("The basic
family unit in the United States is the nuclear family (husband, wife, and children).
The head of the family has an obligation to support, educate, and care for his
dependents; he has a moral obligation to make provision for them in the event of
his death."). Friedman explained that "family succession is considered normal and
natural." Id. Although a definition of family based on the decedent, the decedent's
spouse and children of the two spouses may have served adequately as an
approximate definition of a decedent's dependents in the immediate post World
War II era, increasingly that definition is underinclusive.
52. See infra text accompanying notes 452-466.
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easily articulated as some of the other purposes, societal interests
in supporting the family are implicit in intestacy statutes.
Indeed, succession laws have been described as "an attempt
to express the family in terms of property,"5 3 and succession laws
serve to strengthen family ties, reinforce emotional bonds, and
provide incentive for caring and continued connection among adult
family members. 54 Recognition of family through distribution of
property following the death of a family member carries with it not
only economic benefits, but also, and perhaps as important,
psychological benefits. 55
As society's view of "family" changes, 56 the intestacy statutes
have changed, not only because the decedent's probable intent is
based on a societal view of whom the decedent considers "family,"
but also, perhaps, to reflect the type of family society wants to
support. For example, as adoption became more accepted as a way
to add a family member, intestacy statutes were changed to
include adopted relatives. 57 Also, as the spousal tie within the
nuclear family gained in importance over bloodlines,58 the statutes
increased the amount passing to the surviving spouse.59
53. Gaubatz, supra note 28, at 501 n.10, 507 (citing T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE
HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 711 (5th ed. 1956)).
54. See, e.g., Law Commission, Preliminary Paper 24, Succession Law:
Testamentary Claims; A Discussion Paper 5 (1996) ("An important aim of good laws
of succession is to promote family cohesion. By 'cohesion' we mean strong social
relationships which lend themselves to voluntary co-operation and mutual support
amongst family members.").
55. See Gary, supra note 46 at 416-17 (explaining that "beyond the simple
desire for greater economic benefit, survivors may want or feel entitled to a 'fair'
and equitable distribution, regardless of the amount involved"). If the family
members perceive the distribution as fair, conflict among family members is less
likely to develop. See id. (pointing out that different views of fairness can lead to
conflict).
56. Mary Ann Glendon points to the importance of distinguishing "between the
family as a social group that includes more persons than the marriage partners (if
any), and marriage, which may or may not coincide with the existence of a family."
GLENDON, supra note 7, at 5. She explains that some form of the family exists in
all human societies but marriage is not always part of "the simplest human
societies." Id. Glendon adds, "[tio say that 'the family' is the primary institution,
however, can be misleading unless we specify that families exist in a variety of
forms." Id. at 6.
57. See Jan Ellen Rein, Relatives by Blood, Adoption, and Association: Who
Should Get What and Why, 37 VAND. L. REV. 711, 718 (1984).
58. See GLENDON, supra note 7, at 239.
59. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 112.025 (1999) (distributing the decedent's entire
estate to his or her surviving spouse, unless the decedent left children who were not
children of the surviving spouse). The statute was enacted in 1987 and replaced a
statute that gave only one-half of the decedent's estate to his or her surviving
spouse. Compare 1987 Or. Laws c.591 § 20 with OR. REV. STAT. § 112.025 (1999).
The prior version had been enacted in 1969. Compare 1969 Or. Laws c.329 § 1 with
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With respect to the type of family the intestacy statute
supports, the definition of family may reflect society's view both of
what a family is and what a family should be. At issue in thinking
about intestacy statutes is not only what a decedent wants, but
what society wants. Should family be supported, and if so, should
a statute attempt to determine the decedent's view of who his or
her family is, or should the statute create a definition of family
based on a societal view of family? Since American society is made
up of many different types of family, how can the fixed rules of an
intestacy statute reflect those differences and reach a fair outcome
for the greatest number of decedents? Whose view of family
should influence the statute? If intestacy statutes reinforce family
bonds, should the statutes be sufficiently broad to encompass our
modem families? 60 Before addressing these questions, it is helpful
to examine who actually uses the intestacy statutes - who dies
intestate and why?
B. To Whom Do Intestacy Statutes Apply?
Empirical studies show that many Americans die intestate. 61
Although the bulk of wealth passes without resort to intestacy
statutes, either by will or pursuant to nonprobate transfers, 62
persons with small or modest estates overwhelmingly die without
a will.6 3 Since the heirs of persons with little property can arrange
for the transfer of the decedent's property by using a small estate
affidavit 64 or through means not supervised by a probate court,65
OR. REV. STAT. § 112.085 (1999).
60. See Fellows et al., supra note 16, at 14-15 (examining some of these
questions with respect to the specific issue of recognizing inheritance rights for
surviving committed partners and suggesting that a proposal to change intestacy
statutes to provide an intestate share for committed partners could be viewed three
different ways: (1) as devaluing marriage (and therefore the nuclear family), (2) as
furthering state interests in supporting family functions, and (3) as reinforcing the
dominance of the marriage tradition by encouraging committed partners to conform
to traditional family norms in order to obtain inheritance rights).
61. See, e.g., Fellows et al., supra note 8. See also infra text accompanying
notes 74-81.
62. See WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 14, at 29-32.
63. See Dunham, supra note 28, at 250 (Analyzing probate estates and finding
that frequency of testacy increased in relation to the size of the decedent's estate.
Decedents with probate estates valued below $5,000 had wills only 25% of the time,
while 96% of decedents with probate estates valued in excess of $100,000 had
wills.).
64. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. §§ 114.505-114.560 (1999) (providing for use of a
small estate affidavit by estates with less than $50,000 of personal property and
$90,000 of real property). A surviving heir or devisee can use a small estate
affidavit to transfer title to a decedent's property without a formal probate
proceeding if the value of the estate does not exceed an amount specified in the
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intestacy statutes will apply most often to persons with modest
estates. The financial amounts transferred under intestacy laws
may be small, but to the people involved they matter. And, of
course, even persons of more substantial wealth may die intestate.
Empirical data with respect to testamentary wishes and
frequency of testacy exist, but such data are limited. Nonetheless,
a number of studies over the. past forty years shed light on the
ways in which Americans transfer property at death and on their
preferences for the disposition of their property.66 Studies have
attempted to address four issues: (1) what percentage of people die
intestate; (2) who dies intestate, that is, what factors make it more
or less likely that someone will die intestate; (3) why people choose
not to execute a will; and (4) what preferences people have for the
disposition of their property.6 7
Researchers have used two approaches in their studies. In
one approach, studies are based on information gathered from
death certificates and probate records.68 The researcher draws a
sample of decedents from death certificates and then cross-checks
that sample with probate records. The probate records indicate
statute. See id.
65. See Dunham, supra note 28, at 247-48.
66. See MARVIN B. SUSSMAN ET AL., THE FAMILY AND INHERITANCE (1970);
Beyer, supra note 2 (interviews with 51 persons); Olin L. Browder, Jr., Recent
Patterns of Testate Succession in the United States and England, 67 MICH. L. REV.
1303 (1969) (reviewing probate records in Washtenaw County, Michigan); Dunham,
supra note 28 (focusing on probate records); Fellows et al., supra note 12, at 718 n.3
(analyzing data obtained in 182 telephone interviews based on a randomly drawn
sample); Fellows et al., supra note 16, at 1 (phone interviews); Fellows et al., supra
note 8, at 319 (studying probated wills); Glucksman, supra note 12, at 253
(collecting and analyzing three sets of data: (1) a review of death certificates and
probate records of 100 residents of Morris County, New Jersey who died in 1971; (2)
a telephone survey of 50 Morris County residents conducted in 1975 regarding
knowledge of intestacy law and procedure; and (3) a telephone survey regarding
dispositive preferences of 50 different Morris County residents); Iowa Study, supra
note 12, at 1041 (1978) (comparing estate survivors to randomly selected cross-
section of population); Richard R. Powell & Charles Looker, Decedents' Estates, 30
COLUM. L. REV. 919 (1930) (analyzing judicial statistical reports and inheritance
tax records from several New York counties); Frederick R. Schneider, A Kentucky
Study of Will Provisions: Implications for Intestate Succession Law, 13 No.
KENTUCKY L. REV. 409 (1987); Edward H. Ward & J.H. Beuscher, The Inheritance
Process in Wisconsin, 1950 WIS. L. REV. 393 (1950) (reviewing death certificates
from Dane County, Wisconsin, for 1929, 1934, 1939, 1941 and 1944, and analyzing
a sample of 415 probate files from those years). Society has changed dramatically
since the earliest studies. Changes such as increased size of estates and more
frequent use of property transfers that avoid probate affect the meaning of findings
with respect to testacy.
67. See infra note 82.
68. See, e.g., Dunham, supra note 28, at 241-42 (cross-checking a sample from
death certificates with probate records).
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whether the decedent for whom a probate was opened died testate
or intestate. These studies can provide demographic information
about persons who die testate and intestate and can also provide
data about how those who die with wills dispose of their property.
However, studies based on these public records cannot reveal
whether decedents with no probate estates died without assets or
died with property transferred after death by nonprobate means.
Further, the studies report the dispositive wishes of testate
decedents but not those of intestate decedents - the very group of
concern for intestacy statutes.69
A second research method uses interviews to gather
information from living persons.70 Some surveys have been based
on information gathered from the heirs of decedents7v and some
have been based on random samples. 72 By gathering information
from living persons, researchers can ask about dispositive wishes
broadly, using a variety of hypothetical situations. Studies based
on interviews can obtain information both from those with wills
and from those without wills, but the answers may reflect
aspirational ideals rather than actual plans.7 3
1. Frequency of Testacy
Surveys consistently show that many Americans die without
wills. A study published in 1963 by Allison Dunham reported that
69. See Fellows et al., supra note 8, at 324-26 (describing the limitations of
studies that seek to determine dispositive intent by reviewing probated wills,
stating that persons dying with wills are more likely to be older, wealthier and
employed in white-collar occupations than those who die intestate and that persons
in different socio-economic groups may have different dispositive preferences, and
pointing out that even a probated will may reflect the recommendations of the
decedent's lawyer for tax or other reasons and may not accurately reflect the
testator's personal preferences).
70. See, e.g., Beyer, supra note 2, at 797 (interviews with 51 persons); Fellows
et al., supra note 12, at 720 (181 telephone interviews); Fellows et al., supra note 16
(256 telephone surveys, 87 with persons from the general public, 33 with persons
with opposite-sex committed partners, and 51 with men with same-sex committed
partners and 85 women with same-sex committed partners); Fellows et al., supra
note 8 (750 telephone interviews in five states); Glucksman, supra note 12, at 267
(50 telephone interviews in Morris County, New Jersey); Iowa Study, supra note
12, 1045, 1070 (a survey of 94 intestate estate survivors and interviews with 600
randomly selected citizens).
71. See, e.g., SUSSMAN ET AL., supra note 66.
72. See, e.g., Fellows et al., supra note 12; Fellows et al., supra note 8.
73. Stepparents may feel pressure to treat their stepchildren as they would
their biological or adoptive children. Persons answering questionnaires may
believe that stepparents should treat their stepchildren equally with their legal
children. A study that gathered information from actual wills would be helpful, but
the death records would not indicate stepchildren, so it would be difficult to get
good data without interviews.
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85% of a 1957 sample group of Chicago decedents died without
leaving an estate that required probate.7 4 Of the 15% of decedents
for whom the probate court had records, 55% were testate. 75 Thus,
of total deaths, testate proceedings occurred for only 8.3% of the
decedents. 76  Professor Dunham surmised that failure to
accumulate enough assets to warrant probate accounted for a
substantial portion of the nonprobate deaths, 77 although he noted
that lifetime transfers, nonprobate transfers and consensual non-
judicial administration of estates by family members probably
contributed to the number.78 Of the estates that were probated,
45% were distributed pursuant to the intestacy statute. 79
More recent studies still indicate that many Americans die
intestate.80 Greater use of revocable trusts and other forms of
probate avoidance probably means that some of those who die
without wills do so in reliance on those other means of transferring
property at death and do not leave property subject to intestate
distribution.8 ' Nonetheless, the intestacy system still serves those
who have not prepared formal estate plans and those who intend
to rely on the intestacy statute.
2. Who Dies Intestate?
Three studies in particular have identified characteristics of
those more likely to die without a will.8 2 That information,
combined with information concerning who is more likely to die
without leaving a probate estate,8 3 can prove useful in thinking
about intestacy reform. The demographic characteristics of those
whom the intestacy statutes will serve most often can guide
thinking about appropriate intestate distributions.
Studies have examined age, wealth, occupation, education,
marital status and gender as factors that correlate to the
74. See Dunham, supra note 28, at 244.
75. See id. at 242-45.




80. See infra note 82.
81. See, e.g., Iowa Study, supra note 12, at 1064 (Table 3-Percentage of
Estates Composed Substantially of Joint Property, by Gross Estate Size, stating
that interview respondents with estates from $10,000-49,999 reported holding at
least 78% of their assets in joint tenancy, and respondents with estates between
$50,000 and $99,999 reported that 89% of their assets were held in joint tenancy).
82. See Fellows et al., supra note 8; Glucksman, supra note 12; Iowa Study,
supra note 12.
83. See Glucksman, supra note 12.
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likelihood that a person will die testate or intestate.8 4  Not
surprisingly, age shows a strong correlation with testacy in all
three studies.85 Younger decedents are more likely to die intestate
than older decedents. 86 As individuals age they are more likely to
think about their own death and about how they want their
property distributed after death. Younger persons procrastinate
preparing a will, older persons are more likely to have documents
executed.8 7
Wealth is also a significant factor identifying those who die
testate.8 8 As an individual's estate increases in size the person is
more likely to be concerned with its disposition. Wealth is also
tied to age, since many people accumulate wealth as they get
older. The studies show a direct correlation between greater
wealth and greater likelihood of testacy.8 9
The factors of occupation and education also affect likelihood
of testacy.90 Greater education correlates with greater testacy and
white collar workers are more likely to die testate than blue collar
workers.91 Since education will affect occupation and both are
likely to affect accumulation of wealth, the results of the studies
confirm the findings with respect to wealth as a factor.
One study also found correlations between gender and
testacy, reporting data that showed that women are more likely
than men to die testate even though men are more likely to have
greater wealth.92 Another study found comparable testacy rates
between the men and women surveyed.93
Two of the studies obtained data on marital status and found
that widows and widowers are the most likely of any group (single,
married, divorced) to have wills. 94 Widows and widowers have had
84. See supra note 82.
85. See Fellows et al., supra note 8, at 338 (reporting that 84.6% of respondents
older than 65 had wills); Iowa Study, supra note 12, at 1071-72 (reporting that 77%
of the respondents without a will were under age forty and that of respondents
older than 65, 75% had wills).
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. See Iowa Study, supra note 12, at 1072 (finding, in its sample of probated
estates, only 26% testacy of estates of less than $5,000, but 80% testacy for estates
of $500,000 to $1,000,000, and 100% testacy for estates valued at more than
$1,000,000).
89. See id.
90. See Fellows et al., supra note 8, at 338; Glucksman, supra note 12, at 286.
91. See Fellows et al., supra note 8, at 338; Glucksman, supra note 12, at 286.
92. See Glucksman, supra note 12, at 258-59.
93. See Iowa Study, supra note 12, at 1076.




the experience of dealing with the transfer of a spouse's assets and
are aware of the need for a will. Also, with their spouse no longer
alive, the transfer of property by joint tenancy is less likely to be
an effective mechanism for disposition of their property then when
their spouse was alive.
Although age and wealth are the key factors in determining
who is most likely to die testate or intestate, it is also important to
consider when thinking about intestacy statutes whether those
dying intestate will have probatable estates that will be subject to
intestate distribution. 95 Young persons are the most likely to die
intestate, but they may not have probatable estates. 96 Those most
likely to be affected by intestacy statutes are those with some, but
not too much, accumulated wealth who are still relatively young -
middle-aged persons with modest estates.
3. Why Do People Choose Not to Execute a Will?
If the majority of those who decide not to execute a will do so
because they know that the intestacy statute will distribute their
property in accordance with their dispositive preferences, then a
reconsideration of intestacy law may not be necessary or
advisable. Studies have shown, however, that actual knowledge of
the intestate distributive scheme is limited and failure to execute
a will results more often from procrastination than from
planning.97
Two studies asked specifically about the respondent's reason
for not having a will. In the American Bar Foundation study,
conducted in five different states, 63.6% of respondents who did
not have a will cited "laziness" as the primary reason for not
having a will.98 Other reasons included not having thought about
it, being young and childless and having little property.99 No one
indicated that they were relying on the intestacy statute of their
state.1 00
95. See generally Glucksman, supra note 12, at 257-59 (explaining the
proportional relationship between age and the accumulation of property to
constitute an estate and the correlation between higher wages and a greater
tendency to leave a probatable estate).
96. Unless they have inherited wealth, most young persons probably have not
accumulated many assets. If married, they likely will hold title to their house and
bank account as joint tenants or tenants by the entirety. Only assets held in the
decedent's name alone are subject to probate. See supra note 1.






Similarly, a study conducted in Iowa reported that 56% of one
group of respondents and 57% of a second sample cited "[h]ave not
gotten around to making a will" as the primary reason for not
having a will.101 In that survey, 25% of the first group and 13% of
the second group stated as their reason for not having a will either
that the state would distribute their assets or that their "family"
would get their assets automatically.102 The authors of the study
suggest that these numbers do not reflect satisfaction with the
Iowa statute, but may, in fact, reflect a lack of knowledge about
what happens to the property when someone dies or a reliance on
prior arrangements other than wills that distribute assets to
chosen survivors.'0 3  The authors concluded that the overall
responses did not indicate informed reliance on the intestacy
statute. 0 4 Thus, in the results reported by these two studies,
there is no evidence that any significant number of people are
relying on intestacy statutes to distribute their property or that
changes in the intestacy statutes would adversely affect
expectations. 05
Finally, stepfamily members may be reluctant to discuss
estate planning or to execute wills because of family dynamics. If
relationships between a stepparent and stepchildren are strained,
neither the legal parent nor the stepparent may want to address
issues of property distribution on death. 0 6 Unfortunately, the
temptation to assume that family members will "do the right
thing" after one parent dies, can lead to conflict.' 0 7 Inaction can
result in greater difficulties, particularly for stepfamilies.108
4. What Are Common Dispositive Wishes?
Increasingly, researchers have focused on the question of how
persons prefer to distribute their property. Although decedent's
intent is not the only goal of intestacy statutes, it is the primary
101. Iowa Study, supra note 12, at 1077.
102. See id.
103. See id. at 1077-78.
104. See id. See also Glucksman, supra note 12, at 262-66.
105. See Fellows et al., supra note 8, at 339; Iowa Study, supra note 12, at 1077-
78.
106. See Marjorie Engel, Pockets of Poverty: The Second Wives Club-Examining
the Financial [inisecurity of Women in Remarriages, 5 WM. & MARY J. OF WOMEN
& L. 309, 343-44 (1999) (describing the phenomenon of passive neglect).
107. See id.
108. See id. at 343 (explaining that failure to plan can be problematic for





Until recently, researchers have looked at the distribution of
property primarily within the nuclear family. Several researchers
have compared the preferred share of the surviving spouse with
the shares given surviving children. 110 Empirical data showed
that persons preferred to give the surviving spouse all or most of
the estate, with variations depending upon whether the decedent
left children who were not biological or adopted children of the
surviving spouse."' Studies also found that people preferred the
nuclear family (spouse and children) to the extended family
(parents, siblings and more distant relatives). 112
In a study conducted in 1996 and published in 1998,
researchers looked for the first time at dispositive wishes for
families in which family ties were not defined by blood, adoption or
marriage. 113 The study focused on preferred dispositions for
couples in unmarried committed relationships. Researchers
collected data through telephone interviews with 256 Minnesota
residents in four groups: (1) the general public, (2) persons with
opposite-sex committed partners, (3) women with same-sex
committed partners, and (4) men with same-sex committed
partners. 114 The researchers asked survey participants to state
their distributive preferences in response to eight hypotheticals. 115
The first four hypotheticals posed questions about allocating
property between a surviving partner and parents, siblings or
children. 116 The second four hypotheticals raised questions of
distributions when children of the decedent's partner were added
to the family group. 117 With respect to each hypothetical, the
109. See supra text accompanying notes 28-59.
110. See Fellows et al., supra note 8, at 355-84; Glucksman, supra note 12, at
267-75; Iowa Study supra note 12, at 1081-1100.
111. See Fellows et al., supra note 8.
112. See id.
113. See Fellows et al., supra note 16. A prior study had looked at the question
of whether stepchildren affected dispositive wishes, but only from the perspective of
a parent whose child is not the child of a surviving spouse. The survey
questionnaire asked participants whether the share of the surviving spouse should
change if the decedent left children (1) all of whom were children of the decedent
and the surviving spouse, and (2) some of whom were children of the decedent and
someone other than the surviving spouse. See Fellows et al., supra note 8, at 358,
369.
114. See Fellows et al., supra note 16, at 31. The study used a self-definition of
committed partner for eligibility. See id. at 34. The study also included questions
related to defining a committed relationship. See id. at 53-65.
115. See id. at 37-79.
116. See id. at 37-52.
117. See id. at 72-81.
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question was posed with the decedent in an opposite-sex
relationship, and the researchers then asked the respondents
whether their response would change if the decedent had been in a
same-sex relationship.'18 The researchers recorded little change in
the dispositive choices based on whether the decedent was
involved in an opposite-sex or same-sex relationship.119
Although the focus of the research was public attitudes about
the provision of an intestate share for committed partners
currently unprotected by intestacy statutes, 120 the study is of
significance when considering whether intestacy laws should
include children of gay and lesbian families and stepfamilies.
First, the study reflects the fact that the family pattern in the
United States has changed in ways that the intestacy statutes
have yet to address. 12 1 Second, the study provides the first
empirical data of views concerning intestacy distributions when
the decedent left surviving children who are members of the
decedent's family but are not related to the decedent by blood or
adoption.122
In the first four scenarios (Scenarios A through D), the
researchers asked the respondents to make decisions concerning
dispositive shares when the decedent was survived by a committed
partner and by other family members who were related by blood or
adoption. 123 The four scenarios created the following groups of
survivors: (A) partner and decedent's parents, (B) partner and
decedent's siblings, (C) partner (who has no children) and
decedent's minor child from a prior relationship, and (D) partner,
partner's children from a prior relationship and decedent's
118. See id. at 37-84.
119. See id. at 89. The exact numbers are reported in the article. Generally
speaking, the opposite-sex and same-sex couples reported very little change
(between 95% and 100% reported no change, depending on the scenario), and the
general public sample reported slightly more, but still limited changes in
disposition (between 81% and 89% reported no change). See id.
120. See id. at 3. Hawaii provides a share for a committed partner or other
person who registered with the decedent as a reciprocal beneficiary. See infra text
accompanying notes 226-232.
121. See id. Professor Fellows' prior empirical work demonstrated the
disjunction between intestacy statutes that gave a surviving spouse one-half or one-
third of a decedent's estate and the majority view that if a decedent left a surviving
spouse and either no children or children all of whom were children of the surviving
spouse, then the surviving spouse should receive the entire estate. See Fellows et
al., supra note 12, at 730, 744; Fellows et al., supra note 8, at 356-57. Intestate
reform followed. See supra note 59.
122. See Fellows et al., supra note 16, at 72-84.
123. See id. at 37-52.
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children from a prior relationship. 124  In the last scenario,
respondents were asked what percentage they would give the
surviving partner, but not whether they would give a share to the
partner's children.125
Responses to these scenarios indicate that the majority of
respondents favor giving the committed partner a share of the
estate. 126 This contrasts with the result under current intestacy
laws, which would exclude the committed partner. 27  The
responses vary in the percentage given to the committed partner.
In general, a larger share is preferred if the other survivors are
parents or siblings, 128 whereas a smaller share is preferred if the
other survivors are children of the decedent who are not children
of the committed partner. 129
The responses to these questions demonstrate that the
majority of persons in the survey would leave a share of an
intestate estate to a committed partner, even if the decedent left a
surviving legal child. 130  Those respondents considered a
relationship by affinity, currently outside the intestate statutes,
124. See id.
125. See id. at 49.
126. See id. at 51.
127. See id. at 15.
128. See id. at 37-45.
129. See id. at 45-52. The first scenario involving children is as follows:
[The person has a child under 18 from a prior relationship and the
opposite-sex partner has no children. When the person dies, how would
you divide the estate between the person's child and their [sic] partner?
What percentage of the estate would you give to the child of the person
who dies? What percentage of the estate would you give to the partner of
the person who dies?
Id. at 47. In response, 38.4% of the general public sample, 42.4% of the
respondents with opposite-sex partners, and 57.3% of respondents with same-sex
partners, would give 50% to the partner and 50% to the child; in comparison, 37.2%
of the general public, 30.3% of opposite-sex partners and 6.1% of same-sex partners
would give the entire estate to the child. See id. The second scenario involving
children is as follows:
In [this] situation, a retired widow and retired widower enter into a
committed relationship and live together without getting married. They
both have children from their prior marriages. If the widower dies first,
what percentage of the estate, if any, would you give to his partner? If the
widow dies first, what percentage of the estate, if any would you give to
her partner?
Id. at 49. In response, 41% (widower died first) and 39% (widow died first) of the
general public sample, 39.4% (widower or widow died first) of the respondents with
opposite-sex partners, and 41.9% (widower died first) and 40.3% (widow died first)
of respondents with same-sex partners, would give 50% to the partner and 50% to
the child. In comparison, 28.9% (widower died first) and 30.5% (widow died first) of
the general public and 24.2% (widower or widow died first) of opposite-sex partners
would give the entire estate to the child. See id. at 51.
130. See id. at 49-51.
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worthy of an intestate share. 3 1
The other four scenarios (Scenarios E through H) reflect more
directly on the issue of children who are part of the decedent's
family but who are not legal children of the decedent. 132 In these
scenarios, the decedent is survived by a child who is a child of the
committed partner but not a biological or adopted child of the
decedent.133
In Scenario E, the decedent died survived by two children: (1)
a legal child from a prior relationship and (2) a child who was
conceived or adopted by the decedent's committed partner during
their relationship, raised by the decedent, but never adopted by
the decedent.134 A substantial majority of respondents would
divide the decedent's estate equally between the two children. 135
In this scenario, the nonlegal child joined the family created by the
partners during their relationship and was raised by both
partners. 36 The data suggest that most respondents viewed the
child as a child of the decedent despite the lack of a formal
(biological or adoptive) tie. The facts imply that the decedent
viewed the child as his or her own and that the decedent was a
functional parent although not a legal parent.
The situation in Scenario E is likely to be more common when
the parents are a same-sex couple rather than an opposite-sex
couple. Laws in some states prohibit adoptions by gay men or
lesbian couples, while laws in other states prevent second-parent
adoptions.137 Therefore, even if committed partners decide to have
a child together, the laws may prevent both parents from
becoming legal parents. Although in some ways similar to the
legal barrier to adoption that exists for some stepparents when a
legal parent refuses to consent to the adoption, Scenario E poses a
more straightforward family unit since the child starts with two
parents and continues to live with the same two parents. The
131. See id.
132. See id. at 72-84.
133. See id.
134. See id. at 72-75.
135. See id. at 74 (stating that 80.2% of the general public sample, 87.9% of
opposite-sex partners, and 90.2% of same-sex partners would divide the estate
equally between the two children).
136. See id. at 73.
137. Second-parent adoption refers to an adoption by the committed partner of a
child's biological or adoptive parent. The adoption does not terminate the legal
parent's parental rights. See id. at 70 n.289 (citing statutes in Florida and New
Hampshire that bar adoptions by lesbians and gay men); id. at 70 n.285 (citing
cases in Colorado and Wisconsin that refused to permit an adoption by the same-
sex partner of the child's parent).
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parents view the child as a legal child of both parents.
In Scenarios F through H, the facts include a committed
partner's child from a prior relationship. 138 In Scenarios F and G,
the partner predeceased the decedent. 139 In Scenario F, the
decedent is survived by his or her own child from a prior
relationship and by the partner's child from a prior relationship. 140
Both children had lived in the couple's household.14 ' Interestingly,
given the law's preference for legal children, the number of
respondents who would divide the estate equally between the two
children is still substantial. 142 The scenario does not indicate how
long the child from a prior relationship had lived in the decedent's
household or whether a parent-child relationship existed between
the two. It seems likely that respondents assumed the existence of
a parent-child relationship between the decedent and the partner's
child.143
In Scenario G, the decedent's parents and the partner's child
from a prior relationship survive the decedent. 44 The results here
show that a substantial majority would give half or more of the
estate to the partner's child, 145 and a significant number would
give the entire estate to the partner's child.146 The contrast with
intestacy law, which would give all of the estate to the decedent's
parents, 147 is striking.
In Scenario H, a child raised by both partners (the legal child
of both partners), the partner's child from a prior relationship and
the partner all survive the decedent. 148 The responses are more
varied than in the prior scenarios, but a majority of respondents
would divide the estate among the three takers and treat the two
children equally.149
138. See id. at 74-79.
139. See id. at 74-76.
140. See id. at 74.
141. See id.
142. See id. at 74-76 (stating that 72.1% for the general public sample, 81.8% for
opposite-sex partners, and 90.2% for same-sex partners would divide the estate
equally between the two children).
143. See infra text accompanying note 155.
144. See Fellows et al., supra note 16, at 76.
145. See id. at 77 (stating that 68.6% for the general public sample, 75.8% for
opposite-sex partners, and 90.2% for same-sex partners would give half or more of
the estate to the partner's child).
146. See id. (stating that 20.9% for the general public sample, 21.2% for
opposite-sex partners, and 33.1% for same-sex partners would give the entire estate
to the partner's child).
147. See id. at 76.
148. See id. at 79.
149. See id. at 82.
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In the report analyzing the data in this study, two
preferences stand out-a preference for creating a share for the
surviving partner and a preference for treating children of the
decedent and the committed partner equally, even when one child
is a legal child of the partner but not of the decedent. 150 The
preference for creating a share for the committed partner strongly
supports revising intestacy statutes to provide for such a share.
The data collected will be useful in thinking about two possible
ways to accomplish this-Lawrence Waggoner's proposal to create
an intestate share based on a functional definition of committed
partner1 5 ' and Hawaii's recent legislation creating an intestate
share based on registration by the committed partners as
reciprocal beneficiaries. 152
With respect to children in stepfamilies and children of gay
and lesbian families, the report provides intriguing data and
raises a number of questions. The data suggest that for families
headed by committed partners, support exists for treating children
of the partnership equally with children from a prior
relationship.153 The difficulty in reading the data is that the
scenarios do not attempt to make distinctions based on the type of
relationship that exists between the decedent and the partner's
child.154 Factors such as the duration of the relationship and
whether the relationship began when the child was a minor may
have been assumed by the respondents in answering the questions
posed in connection with the scenarios. 155
The researchers did obtain limited additional information
about how the quality of the parent-child relationship might affect
the dispositive preferences of the survey respondents. Scenario H
states that the committed partner's child lived in the household of
the decedent. 5 6 The researchers asked a follow-up question using
a scenario that was the same as Scenario H, except that the
modified scenario posits that the partner's child had not lived in
the decedent's household. 157 Response to that version of Scenario
H indicated that the respondents would provide a smaller share
150. See id. at 83.
151. See infra text accompanying notes 442-450.
152. See infra text accompanying notes 226-232.
153. See Fellows et al., supra note 16, at 83.
154. See id. at 47-79.
155. The researchers discuss this problem in their report. See id. at 85.
156. See id. at 79.
157. See id. ("We reasoned that respondents might use the distinction between
living inside and outside the household as an indirect way of evaluating the nature
of the relationship between the decedent and the partner's child.").
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for the partner's child under those circumstances. 158 Further, the
number of respondents who would provide no share for the
partner's child increased. 159 These responses indicate that the
quality of the parent-child relationship does affect dispositive
preferences with respect to the partner's child. The difficulty, of
course, lies in creating questions that address that issue. As the
researchers explain, respondents brought their own subjective
interpretations of what it means for the child to have lived in the
household of the couple. 160 The researchers recommend further
research that focuses "on the actual nature of the relationship
between a decedent and a partner's child from a prior
relationship." 161
Public attitudes concerning inheritance by stepchildren may
be different from attitudes about inheritance within families
headed by committed partners. The report itself suggests a
number of questions that must be asked and recommends further
research. 162  Nevertheless, the importance of the report for
stepfamilies, as well as for committed partner families, should not
be minimized. The data provides overwhelming support for the
proposition that the public believes that disposition through
intestacy should reflect families as functional units and not be
based merely on legal ties of marriage, blood and adoption. 163 How
158. See id. at 86. ("Over 47% of the respondents in the general public sample,
over 56% of the respondents with opposite-sex partners and nearly 36% of the
respondents with same-sex partners gave less to the partner's child when the child
never lived in the couple's household than when the child did live in the couple's
household.").
159. See id. at 85-86. Under Scenario H, 23.0% of the general public sample,
18.7% of the opposite-sex partners and 30.8% of the same-sex partners gave the
partner's child nothing; while under the modified version of Scenario H (in which
the child did not live in the decedent's household), 51.6% of the general public
sample, 59.4% of the opposite-sex partners and 53.8% of the same-sex partners
gave the partner's child nothing. See id.
160. See id. at 86.
161. Id. at 87.
162. The researchers recommend empirical study of stepfamily issues and
suggest that the question of a "fair" distribution of a decedent's property should be
examined from the viewpoint of the children as well as from that of the decedent.
See id. at 83 n.324. The report identifies the following issues as appropriate for
further research:
If a partner's child fails to survive the decedent, should that child's lineal
descendants share in the decedent's estate? Should a partner be able to
inherit as a parent from the other partner's child? Should a partner's child
be able to inherit from or through the other partner's family, such as the
other partner's children, siblings or ancestors?
See id. at 84 n.325. These issues are posed as questions that affect disposition of
assets in a family headed by committed partners, but they apply as well to
stepfamilies.
163. See id. at 31-89.
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that can be done is debatable, but this research demonstrates
public support for the proposition that it should be done.
II. Changing Definitions of Family
Intestacy statutes attempt to distribute a decedent's property
to the decedent's family, either because the intestacy statute
strives to approximate the decedent's wishes' 64 or because society
has decided that intestacy statutes should benefit and strengthen
families if a decedent does not express a contrary wish in a will. 65
If family is the focus of several goals behind intestacy statutes,
then understanding what "family" means is important. The
empirical data discussed above reflect significant recent shifts in
perceptions of family. If the family is changing, what does the new
family look like? Scholars have written extensively on this topic in
recent years, trying to make sense of laws that work well for
nuclear families but may not work at all for many of today's more
diverse families. 166
Intestacy statutes almost uniformly use a formal definition of
family: persons related by blood, marriage or adoption. 67 Other
areas of the law have begun to turn to a functional definition of
family, although not in a consistent manner.' 6s In recent years,
general discussions about families and the law have proposed
either changing the formal definition of family to include more
164. See supra text accompanying notes 28-33.
165. See supro text accompanying notes 47-55.
166. See, e.g., Lauren Anderson, Property Rights of Same-Sex Couples: Toward a
New Definition of Family, 26 J. FAM. L. 357 (1987-88); Joseph G. Arsenault,
"Family" But Not "Parent": The Same-Sex Coupling Jurisprudence of the New York
Court of Appeals, 58 ALB. L. REV. 813 (1995); Paris R. Baldacci, Pushing the Law to
Encompass the Reality of Our Families: Protecting Lesbian and Gay Families from
Eviction front Their Homes-Braschi's Functional Definition of 'TFamily" and
Beyond, 21 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 973 (1994); Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking
Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need for Legal Alternatives when the
Premise of the Nuclear Family has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 879 (1984); Martha
Albertson Fineman, Our Sacred Institution: The Ideal of the Family in American
Law and Society, 1993 UTAH L REV. 387 (1993); Haddock & Polsby, supra note 14;
Leslie Joan Harris, Reconsidering the Criteria for Legal Fatherhood, 1996 UTAH L.
REV. 461; Rebecca 1 Melton, Legal Rights of Unmarried Heterosexual and
Homosexual Couples and Evolving Definitions of "Family," 29 J. FAM. L. 497 (1990-
91); Minow, supra note 14; Treuthart, supra note 21; Looking for a Family
Resemblance" The Limits of the Functional Approach to the Legal Definition of
Family, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1640 (1991) [hereinafter "Looking for a Family
Resemblance'].
167. See supra text accompanying notes 17-20; cf. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6454 (West
1991 & Supp. 1999) (providing a share for stepchildren under limited
circumstances).
168. See infra text accompanying notes 261-379.
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family relationships' 69 or relying more frequently on a functional
definition of family in determining the rights and responsibilities
of family members. 170
A look at the family generally begins with the nuclear family
or "conventional" family: defined as a legally married husband and
wife, and the children of that marriage. 171 Of course, even
historically, Americans developed laws that dealt with family
structures that did not fit this definition. For example, common
law marriage grew out of necessity in an expanding country in
outposts where legal marriage was not immediately available.
72
A man and woman who functioned as a married couple were
considered married under the common law even if they had not
been formally married. 173 With respect to children, a requirement
that children be related by blood to be entitled to an inheritance
gave way to laws treating adopted children as full members of the
family. 174
Although some scholars and politicians still regard the
nuclear family as normative, 75 the available data demonstrate
169. See, e.g., Looking for a Family Resemblance, supra note 166, at 1640-41
(advocating registration systems that would permit non-traditional couples to
register and obtain the legal benefits and responsibilities that married couples
have); Anne-Marie E. Rhodes, Abandoning Parents Under Intestacy: Where We Are,
Where We Need to Go, 27 IND. L. REV. 517 (1994) (arguing for the integration of a
functional definition of parenting that focuses on positive acts of responsibility,
favoring a caring parent over an abandoning parent, into the intestate system).
170. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 166, at 480-85 (considering the benefits to the
child of functional fatherhood as the basis for legal fatherhood); Minow, supra note
14 (exploring the functional definition of family in the child custody context).
171. Martha Fineman describes the nuclear family as an ideal venerated in law
and society: "[H]istorically only the nuclear family has been protected and
promoted by legal and cultural institutions." Fineman, supra note 166, at 388.
Despite changes in the laws defining family, Fineman posits that the sacred status
accorded the nuclear family by non-legal institutions continues to privilege the
nuclear family. See id. at 393. Further, she argues that even attempts to challenge
the supremacy of the nuclear family do so by analogy-expanding the definition of
family by being more inclusive but not by challenging the underlying assumptions
of what makes the nuclear family the "natural" family. See id. at 393-94.
172. See Minow, supra note 14, at 270-71 (explaining that finding a minister
qualified to perform marriages and recording the marriage was not always possible
in the frontier of early America).
173. See id.
174. See Rein, supra note 57, at 718-23.
175. See Haddock and Polsby, supra note 14, at 15 (describing the conventional
family as "married persons sharing living quarters with children"). The authors
refer to "the a priori belief, which is still widespread in the socially underdeveloped
inland provinces of the country, that there might be some systematic differences in
the production of socially prejudicial behavior as between conventional married
households on the one hand and contractual quasi-marital households on the
other...." Id. at 15-16.
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that fewer and fewer American families fit this definition of
family. The Census Bureau defines a "family" as made up of "two
or more people living together who are related by blood, marriage,
or adoption, one of whom is the householder."'' 76 This definition
does not recognize other kinds of families such as same-sex or
opposite-sex couples with children. The Census Bureau defines
"own children" as children under eighteen that are "never-married
sons and daughters of the householder," including stepchildren
and adopted children.' 77 Thus, the Census Bureau counts as
"family" only those persons living in a household. The definition
excludes adult children living on their own, whether legal children
or stepchildren. Further, the definition excludes minor children
who reside with another parent.
Given the definitions used by the Census Bureau, reliable
statistics on stepfamilies are difficult to find. Paul Glick, one of
the first to compile data on stepfamilies, s7 8 cautions that statistics
regarding stepfamilies have different meanings depending upon
the terms used. 179 Despite these limitations, the available data do
indicate the growing number of stepfamilies among American
families. 8 0
Glick estimates that in 1987 there were 4.3 million
stepfamilies with children under the age of eighteen.181 He reports
that stepfamilies had 8.78 million children under the age of
eighteen, 5.85 million of whom were stepchildren and the
remaining 2.93 of whom were children born after the
remarriage. 182 These statistics, derived from Census reports, are
based on a definition of stepfamily as a "remarried family with a
child under eighteen years of age who is the biological child of one
of the parents and was born before the remarriage occurred."'183
The number of stepfamilies defined as remarried parents with a
child of any age who is the legal child of one parent but not of the
176. KEN BRYSON & LYNNE M. CASPER, CENSUS BUREAU, HOUSEHOLD AND
FAMILY CHARACTERISTICS: MARCH 1997, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS P20-509
(Apr. 1998).
177. See id.
178. See Paul C. Glick, Living Arrangement of Children and Young Adults, 7 J.
OF COMP. FAM. STUD. 321, 321-33 (1976).
179. See Paul C. Glick, Remarried Families, Stepfantilies, and Stepchildren A
Brief Demographic Profile, 38 FAM. REL. 24, 24 (1989) ("For example, American
stepchildren at a given time are a very small proportion of all children but a
substantial majority of children in renarried famnilies.
180. See id.
181. See id.
182. See id. at 25.
183. See id. at 24.
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other is likely to be much higher. Perhaps for that reason, Jan
Larson estimates that one out of every three Americans is a
member of a stepfamily.'8 4 Larson quotes Paul Glick as stating
"[m]ore than half of Americans today have been, are now, or will
eventually be in one or more step situations during their
lives .... "185
Statistics on same-sex and opposite-sex couples with children
are even more limited. 186 A Census Bureau report published in
1998 shows the increase in the number of unmarried-couple
households from 1960 to 1998.187 The report lists the total number
of unmarried-couple households, households with children under
15 years and households without children under 15 years. 88 The
total number of households increased from 439,000 in the 1960
census, to 523,000 in 1970, to 1,589,000 in 1980, to 2,856,000 in
1990, to 4,236,000 in 1998.189 Unmarried households without
children exceed the number of households with children
throughout this time period, but the percentage of households with
children increased from 1980 to 1997. In 1980, the number of
households with children constituted 27.1% of the total, while in
1998, the number constituted 35.9% of the total.190
Although the census does not distinguish between same-sex
and opposite-sex cohabitants, several surveys have obtained
information from unmarried-couple households. 191  The data
indicate that approximately 30% of the unmarried-couple
households are likely to be same-sex couples and the remainder
were opposite-sex couples.192  Opposite-sex unmarried couples
184. See Jan Larson, Understanding Stepfamilies (Creating Niche Markets front
the Special Needs of Stepfamilies), AM. DEMOGRAPHICS July 1992, at 36, 36; see also
Engel, supra note 107, at 313 (stating that one out of every three Americans is a
member of a stepfamily).
185. See Larson, supra note 184, at 36.
186. See Dominick Vetri, Almost Everything You Always Wanted to Know About
Lesbians and Gay Men, Their Families, and the Law, 26 S.U.L. REV. 1, 23 (pointing
to the inadequate documentation of unmarried couple families by the Census
Bureau and finding the Census Bureau categorization of same-sex and opposite-sex
couples as "non-family" households offensive).
187. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Unnmarried-Couple Households, by Presence of




190. See id.; see also Glick, supra note 179, at 25 (estimating that in 1987 there
were 7.25 million families of unmarried adults with children under the age of 18
and 5.7 million families of unmarried adults with young adult children or other
relatives sharing the household).
191. See Fellows et al., supra note 16, at 3 nn.5-7.
192. See id. at 3 (citing American Demographics Inc., One-third of Unmarried
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were more likely to have children under fifteen living in the house
than same-sex couples (35% of opposite-sex couples and 8-9% of
same-sex couples).' 93 The survey data indicate that the number of
opposite-sex households is growing at a rate faster than that of
same-sex households. 194
Detailed information on the number of stepfamilies or gay
and lesbian families is beyond the scope of this Article. However,
the limited data available for stepfamilies and for gay and lesbian
families support the general perception that the structure of
American families has changed from the nuclear norm and will
continue to change in the future. 95
III. Legal Responses to Changes in Family Structure
How has the law begun to address the changes in family
structure? Martha Minow worries "about preserving a set of legal
rules that have little relationship to how people actually live." 196
Nevertheless, in some areas of the law legislatures and courts are
attempting to create legal rules that do make sense for today's
diverse families. 197 In so doing, courts, legislatures and scholars
advocating change make use of two approaches-a formal
approach and a functional approach.
A. Formal Approach
One approach is to bring "new" families into the fold. If the
law uses a formal definition of family-a definition based on blood
Partners Are Gay, THE NUMBER NEWS, May 1996, at 1).
193. See id. (citing ARLENE F. SALUTER, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT
POPULATION REPORTS, SERIES P20-484, MARITAL STATUS AND LIVING
ARRANGEMENTS: MARCH 1994, xiii (1996)).
194. See id.; see also Vetri, supra note 186, at 25-27.
195. See Carolyn R. Glick, The Spousal Share in Intestate Succession:
Stepparents are Getting Shortchanged, 74 MINN. L. REV. 631, 631 (1990)
("American families have changed dramatically in the last twenty-five years."); Sol
Lovas, When is a Family not a Family? Inheritance and the Taxation of Inheritance
Within the Non-Traditional Family, 24 IDAHO L. REV. 353, 353 (1987-88) ("The
American family is changing. Fewer American households consist of a 'traditional'
family, that is, a husband and wife and their children."); Margaret M. Mahoney,
Stepfamilies in the Law of Intestate Succession and Wills, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
917, 917 (1989) ("Many modern families do not take the form of the traditional
nuclear family.").
196. See Minow, supra note 14, at 271. Minnow's comment relates to the failure
of a New York court to treat a lesbian mother as a "parent' for purposes of
considering child visitation. See infra text accompanying notes 327-340.
197. Changes have occurred with respect to child custody and visitation issues in
family law, interpretation of housing statutes, wrongful death statutes, worker's
compensation and employee benefits. See infra text accompanying notes 289-379.
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or formal legal registration processes like marriage and adoption,
then by permitting families to create formal legal relationships as
well as personal relationships, more persons can declare
themselves a family for purposes of legal rules. The most
extensive changes have occurred in connection with adoption.
Other changes in recent years mark the beginning of attempts to
include committed partners as family members for some
purposes., 9s
1. Changes to the formal definition of family
a. Adoption
Although family relationships on a personal, non-legal level
probably have always included children who are not the biological
children of the male and female heads of the family, legally
recognized adoption is a relatively recent addition to the formal-
and legal-definition of family. 199  In the United States, state
legislatures began to adopt formal rules on adoption in the mid-
nineteenth century.200 Adoption of a minor child now creates a
parent-child relationship, which will be treated legally in the same
manner as the relationship between a parent and a biological
child.201
Although adoptive children are treated under the law like
biological children, the formal adoption of children with whom an
adult has a parent-child relationship may not always be possible.
In a stepfamily situation, adoption may not be an option to create
a legal tie. For example, a stepparent may wish to adopt his or her
stepchild, but if the child's legal parent does not consent, the law
will not permit an adoption.
For same-sex committed partners, if one partner seeks to
adopt his or her partner's child, the couple may find that the
adoptive mother's (or father's) legal tie to the child will cut off the
198. For a discussion of Hawaii statute, see infra text accompanying notes 226-
232.
199. For examination of the history of adoption, see MORTON I. LEAVY & ROY D.
WEINBERG, LAW OF ADOPTION (4th ed. 1979); Stephen B. Presser, The Historical
Background of the American Law of Adoption, 11 J. FAM. L. 443 (1971); Rein supra
note 57, at 711.
200. Texas and Vermont passed general adoption statutes in 1850. See LEAVY &
WEINBERG, supra note 199, at 2. Massachusetts adopted a comprehensive adoption
law in 1851. See Mass. Acts ch. 324, cited in Rein, supra note 57, at 716 n.21.
England did not legalize adoption until 1926. See Adoption of Children Act, 1926,
16 & 17 Geo. 5, ch. 29, cited in Rein, supra note 57, at 714 n.10.
201. See 2 HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES, PRACTITIONER'S EDITION 565 (2d ed. 1988).
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biological mother's (or father's) legal connection. 20 2 In addition,
laws in some states prohibit adoptions by gay men and lesbian
couples. 203 Therefore, even if committed partners decide to have a
child together, the laws may prevent both parents from becoming
legal parents.
Adult adoption provides another legal relationship, allowing
the persons involved to fit within the formal definition of family for
purposes of many different laws. Same-sex committed partners,
who cannot legally marry, may choose adoption as a means of
creating a legal relationship to give legal recognition to the family
they have created together.20 4 Most, but not all, states permit
adult adoption. 20 5
New York courts have permitted adult adoptions in two cases
involving same-sex committed partners who turned to adoption to
create a legal relationship. 206 In the second of these cases, In re
Adult Anonymous 1,207 the parties sought the adoption to secure
the right to remain together in an apartment leased to one of
them. 208 The lease allowed "any immediate family members" to
occupy the apartment.2 9 The court allowed the adoption and
stated that a court should not deny a petition for adoption on the
basis of a narrow definition of family.210 Rather, the court
described a family as "a continuing relationship of love and care,
and an assumption of responsibility for some other person,"211 and
noted that a family relationship existed between the two men.
2 12
The court permitted the adoption, allowing the men to create a
202. See Fellows et al., supra note 16, at 69-70 n.285 (citing cases in Colorado
and Wisconsin that refused to permit an adoption by the same-sex partner of the
child's parent). Other states permit second parent adoptions-an adoption by the
committed partner of a child's biological or adoptive parent that does not terminate
the legal parent's parental rights. See id.; Maxwell S. Peltz, Second-Parent
Adoption: Overcoming Barriers to Lesbian Family Rights, 3 MICH. J. GENDER & L.
175 (1995).
203. See Fellows et al., supra note 16, at 70 n.289 (citing statutes in Florida and
New Hampshire that bar adoptions by lesbians and gay men).
204. Cf. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-6-2 (Michie 1998) ("Any minor child may be
adopted by any adult person. However, the person adopting the child must be at
least ten years older than the person adopted.").
205. For an extensive discussion of adult adoption, see Rein, supra note 57, at
749-65. See also CLARK, supra note 201, at 674-76.
206. See In re Adoption of Adult Anonymous, 435 N.Y.S.2d 527 (1981); In re
Adult Anonymous II, 452 N.Y.S.2d 198 (1982).
207. In re Adult Anonymous II, 452 N.Y.S.2d 198, 200 (1982).
208. See id.
209. Id.





legal relationship while implicitly recognizing that the
relationship was not a parent-child relationship. 21 3 Judge Sullivan
argued in dissent that the purpose of adoption is to create a
parent-child relationship and that legal recognition of other family
relationships should be left to the legislature. 214
Subsequently, in In re Adoption of Robert Paul p.,215 the New
York Court of Appeals refused to allow the adoption of a fifty-year-
old man by his fifty-seven-year-old committed partner.216 The two
men sought the adoption to give legal formality to their twenty-
five year relationship. 217 The court held that adoption should not
be used as a "quasi-marital vehicle."2 18  Since the two men
admittedly did not have a parent-child relationship, the court
rejected the petition for adoption.219
b. Marriage
Like adoption, marriage creates a legal family relationship
between persons who are not related by blood. In general, legal
marriage carries with it rights and responsibilities, regardless of
whether the spouses function as a family. However, in some
circumstances the fact that spouses are not functioning as a family
will affect the spouses' legal rights. For example, in most common
law states a surviving spouse has the right to an elective share of
the estate of the decedent spouse, regardless of whether the
spouses conducted their lives as married persons. However, in
New Jersey the elective share is barred unless the spouses were
living together when the first spouse died,220 and in Oregon the
elective share can be denied or reduced if the spouses were living
apart when one of the spouses died.221
Under current law no state in the United States permits two
persons of the same sex to marry.222 Thus, the law prohibits many
213. See id. at 200.
214. See id. at 203.
215. 471 N.E.2d 424 (N.Y. 1984).
216. See id. at 426-27.
217. See id. at 425.
218. Id.
219. See Anderson, supra note 166, at 363 (discussing these two adoption cases
and stating, "[flor the present, as the statutory language of both the marriage and
adoption laws have been construed as precluding gay couples from their scopes,
sympathetic courts are forced to continue to fashion imaginative means by which
gay partners can obtain some recognition as family members").
220. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:8-1 (West 1999).
221. See OR. REV. STAT. § 114.135 (1999).
222. See, e.g., Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (denying a same-sex
couple the right to marry); Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971) (same);
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couples who would like to fit within a formal legal definition of
family from doing so. Making marriage available to same-sex
couples would expand the formal definition of family to include
more persons who think of themselves as a family, but the current
political climate makes this approach infeasible, at least in the
short term.2 23 Further, some couples, both opposite-sex and same-
sex committed partners, prefer not to marry.
c. Domestic Partner Ordinances
Although same-sex couples cannot currently marry, in some
places and for some purposes same-sex couples and unmarried
opposite-sex couples can register as a domestic partnership, legally
declaring themselves a couple-and a family.224 Some cities and
companies provide employment benefits that are equivalent to the
benefits a married person would receive if an unmarried partner
registers.225  Like adoption, registration creates a legal
relationship that then signifies, for at least some purposes, that
the parties come within a formal definition of family.
Storrs v. Holcomb, 645 N.Y.S.2d 286 (Sup. Ct. 1996) (same); Baker v. State of
Vermont (visited Sept. 29, 1999) <httpJ/www.qrd.org/usallegal/ lglh1998/12.98>
(rejecting a challenge to Vermont's refusal to grant marriage licenses to same-sex
couples). See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., A History of Same-Sex Marriage,
79 VA. L. REV. 1419 (1993) (recounting the history of same-sex marriage to provide
support for arguments that states should end their prohibition of same-sex
marriage); Sylvia A. Law, Honosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988
WIs. L. REV. 187, 187 (listing the fact that "no state allows people of the same sex
to marry" as one of the many legal restrictions and legal sanctions imposed on gay
men and lesbians).
223. In response to attempts to legalize same-sex marriages, Congress in 1996
enacted the Defense of Marriage Act. This Act provides that the Federal
government will not recognize same-sex marriage for purposes or benefits under
the tax or social security systems even if a state legalizes such marriages. Defense
of Marriage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-199 § 2(a), 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified
at 1 U.S.C. § 7 and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C).
224. See Vetri, supra note 186, at 62-63 (listing 32 cities and counties that
permit the registration of domestic partnerships).
225. See Sue Nussbaum Averill, Desperately Seeking Status: Same-Sex Couples
Battle for Employment-Linked Benefits, 27 AKRON L. REV. 253 (1993); Robert L.
Eblin, Domestic Partnership Recognition in the Workplac Equitable Employee
Benefits for Gay Couples (and Others), 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 1067 (1990); Steven N.
Hargrove, Domestic Partnerships Benefits: Redefining Family in the Workplace, 6
Loy. CONSUMER L. REP. 49 (1994); Kate Latimer, Domestic Partners and
Discrimination: The Need for Fair Employment Compensation, 12 HAMLINE J. PUB.
L. & POLY 329 (1991); Vetri, supra note 186, at 64-75 (providing detailed
information on companies, municipalities, universities and three states-Vermont,
Oregon and New York-that provide employee benefits to domestic partners and
discussing federal legislation that would make benefits available to domestic
partners of federal employees).
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d. Hawaii Statute-Registration as Reciprocal Beneficiaries
In 1997, Hawaii created a legal relationship called a
"reciprocal beneficiary relationship."226 The Hawaii statute now
provides that two people at least 18 years of age who cannot
legally marry can register as reciprocal beneficiaries and obtain
certain of the rights and benefits available to married couples. 227
The statute states that the new legal relationship is available for
any two people who cannot legally marry and who are not a party
to another reciprocal beneficiary relationship, including a widowed
mother and her son.228 The legislation permits same-sex couples
to create a legal relationship, but states that opposite-sex couples
cannot register as reciprocal beneficiaries. 229  The reciprocal
beneficiary relationship is created when the parties sign a
declaration of reciprocal beneficiary relationship, have their
signatures notarized and file the declaration with the director of
finance who maintains a record of each declaration. 230
Although the statute does not give reciprocal beneficiaries all
of the rights and obligations a married couple has under Hawaii
law, the act does grant marriage-like benefits under a variety of
Hawaii statutes. 231  For purposes of intestacy, a surviving
reciprocal beneficiary is given the same share a surviving spouse
would receive under intestate succession.232
The Act, however, does not affect the status of children in a
family headed by a same-sex couple registered as reciprocal
beneficiaries. For example, assume that a same-sex couple decides
to raise a child together, and a child is born to one of the partners
through artificial insemination. Both partners consider
themselves the child's parents, but one parent is a biological
parent and one parent is not related to the child by blood or
adoption. The registration of the child's parents (the same-sex
226. See 1997 HAW. HOUSE BILL 118 (1997).
227. See HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 572C-3, 572C-4 (1998).
228. See §§ 572C-2, 572C-4.
229. See § 572C-4.
230. See § 572C-5.
231. For example, the Act extends to reciprocal beneficiaries the same rights
spouses have in connection with a variety of employer-provided benefits, including,
among others, health benefits for state and county employees, employer provided
family insurance coverage, vacation allowances and funeral leave. See 1997 HAw.
HOUSE BILL 118 (1997). The Act gives reciprocal beneficiaries the same powers as
spouses over health care decision making and the right to an elective share of the
estate of a deceased reciprocal beneficiary. See id. The registration of the
reciprocal beneficiaries operates like a marriage in revoking the wills of both
beneficiaries. See id.
232. See HAw. REV. STAT. § 560:2-102 (1998).
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couple) does not confer parental rights on the non-biological
parent. Thus, if the non-biological parent dies, the child will
receive no share under the intestacy statute.
2. Effect of Changes in the Formal Definition of Family on
Intestacy Statutes
a. Adoption
For centuries laws tied inheritance to bloodline and
legitimacy. Illegitimate children and family members not related
by blood fell outside the scope of the inheritance laws.23 3 Although
adoption created legal rights for many purposes beginning in the
mid-nineteenth century, 234 much more recently intestacy and
inheritance statutes have addressed questions of inheritance for
and through adopted children.
In general, adopted children now inherit under intestacy
through their adoptive families, but states vary with respect to
whether children inherit only through their adoptive family or also
through their biological family. Some states treat the adoption as
cutting off ties with the biological family. Other states permit
inheritance through both the adoptive and biological relatives. A
few states permit inheritance from biological relatives of a
deceased parent if the adoption took place after the death of the
deceased biological parent.235
A different issue arises with respect to inheritance under a
will or trust executed by a relative other than an adopted child's
adoptive parents-a stranger to the adoption. For example, if a
grandmother's will makes a gift to "grandchildren," should that
gift include adopted grandchildren? In keeping with "modern"
thinking about adoption-that adoption makes the adopted child a
member of the new family for all purposes-statutes and courts
increasingly permit adopted children to take under documents
executed by members of their adoptive family. 236
An exception to permitting adopted persons to inherit
through, as well as from, their adoptive parents, exists in some
233. See Lovas, supra note 195, at 367 ("A legitimate natural child is a 'child' for
inheritance purposes. Beyond that, it gets complicated.").
234. See supra note 200.
235. See DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 4, at 92-100; Rein, supra note 57,
at 720-28.
236. The issue often becomes one of interpreting the document-in using the
term "grandchildren" did the grandparent intend to include adopted children?
Should the answer turn on the definition of "child" in the intestacy statutes in force
at the time the grandparent's will or trust was executed?
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states for persons adopted as adults for the purpose of inheritance.
In some cases, an adult adoption occurs because the adopting
adult (parent) and adopted adult (child) have no other means to
create a legal relationship to give legal support to their family
relationship. For example, same-sex committed partners may
turn to adoption to create intestacy rights as protection against a
will contest,237 or for other reasons. In other situations, however,
one adult adopts another solely for the purpose of fitting within a
specific dispositive term in an existing document.
The latter situation does not always achieve the goal of the
adopter. In a Kentucky case, 23 8 a man adopted his wife so that she
could receive a distribution from a trust created by the man's
mother. 239 The trust provided that on the death of the last
surviving child of the mother the trust assets were to be
distributed to the mother's heirs. 240 Although the adoption was
legal and the wife was, therefore, technically an heir of the man's
mother, the Kentucky Court of Appeals decided that "[a]doption of
an adult for the purpose of bringing that person under the
provisions of a preexisting testamentary instrument when he
clearly was not intended to be so covered should not be
permitted."241 The adopted wife did not share in the distribution
from her mother-in-law's (grandmother's) trust.242
With respect to intestacy, the question of intent is perhaps
less difficult. The property owner is, necessarily, alive when the
adoption occurs and can execute a will to dispose of his or her
property. With an adult adoption, however, the property owner
may not realize that the adoption has occurred and may not be on
notice that executing a will is necessary to carry out the property
owner's intent.243 In general, however, the hurdle to inheritance
237. If one committed partner adopts the other partner, the "child" becomes the
intestate heir of the "parent," and the parent becomes the heir of the child. When
one partner dies, that partner's blood relatives will not have standing to contest his
or her will because the blood relatives are no longer the intestate heirs of the
deceased partner. For committed partners, adult adoptions have many purposes
other than attempted inheritance through a family member's will or trust.
238. See Minary v. Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust Co., 419 S.W.2d 340 (Ky.
1967).
239. See id. at 341.
240. See id.
241. Id. at 344.
242. See id.. See also In re Belgard's Trust, 829 P.2d 457, 460 (Colo. Ct. App.
1991) (deciding adopted wife excluded from those entitled to take); In re Jones, 411
A.2d 910, 911 (R.I. 1980) (rejecting adoption of heterosexual lover as petitioner was
married to another woman).
243. See Edward C. Halbach, Jr., The Rights of Adopted Children Under Class
Gifts, 50 IOWA L. REV. 971, 988 (1965) (arguing that adult adoptions pose minimal
[Vol. 18:1
CHANGING FAMILIES
through intestacy is likely to be whether state law will permit the
adult adoption.
Note that in all of these adoption situations, the question for
inheritance purposes is the formal legal definition of family rather
than whether the person functioned as a family. The adopted
person is treated as part of a family by statute, regardless of the
actual family circumstances. For example, in some states ties
with biological grandparents are assumed to continue after an
adoption by a stepparent, while in other states the adoption cuts
off legal ties with the deceased parent's family. The statutes and
the courts focus on the legislatively provided definition of family,
rather than whether or not the adopted person maintained
connections with his or her biological family.
b. Equitable Adoption
In limited circumstances a child may be able to take an
intestate share of a "parent's" estate under the doctrine of
equitable adoption. The doctrine is occasionally used in a
situation in which a child has lived with adults whom the child
considers parents but who are not the child's biological parents
and who have not formally adopted the child. Courts have applied
the equitable adoption doctrine in situations where an attempt to
adopt the child failed for minor mechanical reasons 244 or where the
child can prove that the "parents" with whom the child lived
entered into a contract to adopt the child. 245 If the biological
parents and the child have performed under the contract, then the
court may enforce the contract using a theory of specific
performance, an estoppel theory or some combination of the two
theories.2 46 In no event can the doctrine be used to create an
intestate share in favor of the adoptive parents, since they did not
perform under the contract. 247
Although courts have permitted inheritance under the
problems for intestacy). But see Rein supra note 57, at 755 (arguing that problems
persist).
244. See Rein, supra note 57, at 766-67; Equitable Adoption: They Took Him Into
Their Home and Called Him Fred, 58 VA. L REV. 727, 737 (1972).
245. See Rein, supra note 57, at 770-87.
246. See id. (providing a detailed examination of the law of equitable adoption);
see also CLARK, supra note 201, at 676-82; DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 4,
at 105-06.
247. See Heien v. Crabtree, 369 S.W.2d 28 (Tex. 1963), discussed in CLARK,
supra note 201, at 680. Further, the child cannot inherit through the adoptive
parents. See Board of Educ. v. Browning, 635 A.2d 373, 380 (Md. 1994) (explaining
an equitably adopted child could not inherit from her adoptive aunt, even though
the aunt's estate escheated to the state).
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doctrine of equitable adoption, relief is available under very
limited circumstances. The child must be able to prove either
substantial compliance with the adoption requirements 248 or the
existence of a contract, 249 either of which will be difficult if not
impossible to establish in many situations in which the
arrangement is informal.250 For stepchildren, the doctrine of
equitable adoption is of even less utility. Courts have held that a
stepparent relationship is inconsistent with a claim of equitable
adoption.251 The stepparent would have provided love, affection
and care for a stepchild, and vice versa, as part of a stepfamily
relationship. No consideration beyond that could exist for an
adoption contract. Further, the legal impossibility of adoption,
common in many stepparent situations, makes a contract to adopt
impossible.2 52
c. Effectiveness of the Formal Approach in the
IntestacyContext
The formal definition of family has expanded to take in more
family members, yet many families still do not fit within any
existing legal definition of family for inheritance purposes. Any
attempt to rely solely on a formal definition of family for
inheritance purposes faces several problems.
The existing legal mechanisms to create family ties do not
address all family circumstances. Adoption can be used by some
families to give legal recognition to a parent-child relationship, but
adoption is not a viable option for all families. 253 No state permits
same-sex marriage, and registration as committed partners is of
limited utility in creating a legal status as a family.
Even if laws permit family members to create a legal
relationship through registration or adoption, many people may
simply not take advantage of those laws. If the sole reason for
creating a legal tie is inheritance, many people will likely not take
the necessary legal step due to procrastination, psychological
resistance, or the expense involved. After all, any person can
avoid the application of the intestacy rules altogether by executing
248. See Rein, supra note 57, at 770-87.
249. See CLARK, supra note 201, at 678.
250. See id. at 677-78 ("[A] close reading of the cases leaves the impression that
there is little appreciation of the basis for the doctrine and correspondingly little
enthusiasm about applying it beyond a very limited range of cases.").
251. See MAHONEY, supra note 22, at 61.
252. See id.; ENGEL, supra note 106, at 357-58.
253. See supra text accompanying notes 202-203.
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a will. Persons may fail to take steps to declare themselves a legal
family for the same reasons that many people die intestate.
25 4
For all these reasons, a formal definition of family may be
both underinclusive and overinclusive. The definition may be
underinclusive because it excludes many currently existing family
groups: same-sex couples, children of a same-sex couple who have
not been adopted by their nonbiological mother or father,
stepchildren who have not been adopted by their stepparents, and
biological relatives who maintain family ties with children who
have been adopted by their stepparents. The definition may be
overinclusive because legal ties do not necessarily create familial
ties. A biological parent who abandons his or her child will still
have a legal tie to the child unless steps are taken to terminate the
parental rights. For example, in a Vancouver, Washington case
reported in the press, a father who had never met his son
inherited $500,000 as the son's only heir after the son's death at
age forty-three.255
Because of these problems, Anne-Marie Rhodes has argued
that in applying intestacy statutes courts should interpret the
definition of "parent" functionally so that an abandoning parent
would not take an intestate share of a deceased child's estate.25 6
That is, if a person dies intestate and the decedent's heirs under
the intestacy statute are the decedent's "parents," then a biological
parent who had abandoned his or her child would not meet the
definition of parent. 25 7 Rhodes points to the use of a fact-specific
standard in many wrongful death statutes, in which recovery of
damages is based on dependency and on the subjective
relationship between the decedent and the survivors. 2M Damages
are distributed proportionate to the loss suffered and the "loss" can
include loss of society or companionship as well as pecuniary
loss. 25 9 To distribute damages, the court must determine actual
family ties-rather than make a distribution based simply on
254. See supra text accompanying notes 97-105.
255. See Fortune Links Father To Son He Never Met, REGISTER GUARD (Eugene,
Oregon), Feb. 27, 1993, at IA. (Margaret Peterson raised a son fathered by Daniel
Peterson. Daniel Peterson had no contact with the mother or the son after the son
was born. Margaret Peterson died in 1986, and when the son died in 1991 in an
automobile accident he left no known heirs. Heir locators found Daniel Peterson
and DNA testing established with near certainty that he was the decedent's
father.).
256. See supra note 169 at 526.
257. See id. at 526-27.
258. See id. at 521.
259. See id. at 521-22.
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blood or other legal ties. 260
B. Functional Approach
Consistent with Rhodes' logic, a number of courts, scholars
and others concerned with the application of laws to families
advocate a functional approach to defining what a family is and
who should be included as family members. 261  Initially, a
functional approach raises the question of what a family is rather
than who is in the family. In order to determine whether
identified persons are acting like family members, it is necessary
first to determine what a family does-what makes a family a
family? Indeed, some critics of the functionalist approach express
concern that functionalism will be detrimental to non-traditional
families.2 62 If the functional definition of family is based on the
way a nuclear family functions, then many non-traditional
families may still be left out of the definition. The difficulty in
defining a family in functional terms is reflected in the different
legal approaches that have been taken in developing a definition of
family.
1. Public Policy in California
In a 1921 case involving a claim for a death benefit under the
California Workmen's Compensation Act,263  the California
260. See id. at 521-24.
261. See, e.g., Braschi v. Stahl Assoc., 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989) (holding that
the term family in a New York statute included gay life partners who had lived
together for 10 years, shared financial obligations and attended family functions as
a couple); Bartlett supra note 166, at 882-83, 944-63; Minow, supra note 14, at 270
("[W]hat is important is whether the group of people function as a family- do they
share affection and resources, think of one another as family members, and present
themselves as such to neighbors and others?"); Treuthart, supra note 21, at 99 ("[A]
family consists of a community, which: (1) provides financial and emotional support
to the members, (2) involves interdependence and commitment, and (3) allows
transcendence of self-interest to an unlimited degree").
262. See Looking for a Family Resemblance, supra note 166, at 1653 (noting that
"functionalism requires that all alternative families resemble traditionally
recognized relationships in function, if not in precise form"). The Article identifies
three problems: (1) the lack of precise standards resulting in loss of stability of the
relationships, (2) the intrusive judicial examination into the intimate details of the
lives of family members in order to determine whether a family relationship exists
and (3) the marginalization of non-traditional families by treating them differently
from traditional families (i.e., by requiring non-traditional families, but not
traditional families, to prove their status as a family). See id. at 1653-55. The
Article also points out that these criticisms are more troubling in the context of a
committed partner relationship than in a parent-child relationship. See id. at 1655.




Supreme Court stated: "[Family] means different things under
different circumstances. The family, for instance, may be... a
particular group of people related by blood or marriage, or not
related at all, who are living together in the intimate and mutual
interdependence of a single home or household."264 In the case, an
undivorced woman and her child Ida had been abandoned by the
woman's husband (the child's father).265 Ida and her mother lived
with the decedent before his death.26 6 The man and woman held
themselves out as husband and wife, and the man treated Ida as
his daughter. 267 The statute at issue provided a death benefit for
dependent members of the decedent's "family" or "household"268
and the court held that Ida qualified as a member of the decedent's
family or household. 269
Two reports from California reflect more recent attempts to
create an understanding of families in order to plan policies and
laws that support and strengthen California families. 270 Both
reports reflect attempts to define the family in terms of the
functions the family performs or the functions society relies upon
families to perform. 271
The Joint Select Task Force on the Changing Family issued a
report in April 1989 in an attempt to assist public and private
policymakers in creating a coherent family policy that would
support families. 272 To do so, the task force looked at "the
functions that society relies upon families to perform" as a way of
creating a definition of the family. 273 The report explained the
importance of families and the functions a family serves: "Families
play an essential and unique role in society. They care for
dependents economically and emotionally, offer a foundation for
264. Id. at 259.
265. See id. at 257.
266. See id.
267. A concurring opinion described the man's relationship as in loco parentis
with Ida. See id. at 260 (Olney, J., concurring).
268. The statute provided a death benefit for a "stepchild" who was dependent on
the decedent, but Ida was not a stepchild because her mother had not married the
decedent. See id. at 259.
269. See id. at 260.
270. See SHERRY NOVICK ET AL., PLANNING A FAMILY POLICY FOR CALIFORNIA:
FIRST YEAR REPORT OF THE JOINT SELECT TASK FORCE ON THE CHANGING FAMILY
(April 1989) [hereinafter CHANGING FAMILY]; LOS ANGELES (CALIF.) TASK FORCE
ON FAMILY DIVERSITY, FINAL REPORT: STRENGTHENING FAMILIES, A MODEL FOR
COMMUNITY ACTION (1988) [hereinafter FAMILY DIVERSITY].
271. See CHANGING FAMILY, supra note 270, at 7-8; FAMILY DIVERSITY, supra
note 270, at xvi.
272. See CHANGING FAMILY, supra note 270, at 9.
273. See id. at 7.
2000]
Law and Inequality
the values and ethics of each new generation, motivate children to
achieve educationally, and provide a sense of belonging that is
essential to human growth and dignity. 274 The task force created
a set of principles that label the family as society's "primary social
and economic unit," describe what a family is by stating the
functions families perform and direct policymakers to respect the
diversity of today's families. 75
A task force created by the City of Los Angeles, the Task
Force on Family Diversity, also studied families and public
policy. 276  This task force determined that "the central
characteristic underlying family is mutual interdependency. Thus,
family may refer to a group of unmarried persons not related by
blood, but who are living together and who have some obligation,
either legal or moral, for the care and welfare of one another."2 77
The task force began its work by looking for an existing legal
definition of family and found, not surprisingly, that California
law does not have one uniform definition of family. 278 The task
force identified two examples of the legislature's using the formal
definition (related by blood, marriage or adoption) to define family:
the provision of allowances for family members during estate
administration and the veterans-home-purchase program. 279
The task force also found examples of the use of a functional
definition of family. 280 In 1980, the California Supreme Court held
unconstitutional a City of Santa Barbara zoning ordinance that
defined a single family unit as a group related by blood, marriage
or adoption. 28 1 The court found that a group of 12 adults who lived
together in a single house constituted a family. 282 The group had
social, economic and psychological commitments to each other and
regarded their group as a family. 283 In a second example, the task
force pointed to domestic violence legislation that defined "family
members" to include a variety of adult household members. 284
As evidence of the use of a functional definition on an
274. Id. at 4.
275. See id. at 10-11.
276. See FAMILY DIVERSITY, supra note 270.
277. Id. at 18-19.
278. See id. at 21.
279. See id. at 20.
280. See id. at 19.
281. See City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 610 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1980).
282. See id. at 442.
283. See id. at 438.
284. See FAMILY DIVERSITY, supra note 270, at 20 (citing CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE § 18921 (1986)).
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administrative basis, the task force cited a 1982 survey of federal,
state and municipal agencies in California that used the terms
"family" or "household" in operating their programs. 2 5 Seventy-
five percent of the responding agencies indicated that they were
not bound by a definition based solely on blood, marriage or
adoption, and respondents reported using administrative
discretion to define family in an expanded way. 28 6 The task force
noted that multiple definitions of family were already in use and
recommended continuing use of flexible family definitions.28 7
2. Family Law
In connection with issues involving parental rights and
responsibilities, family law has struggled with the question of who
should be considered a parent. Although parental rights and
responsibilities follow from a legal relationship with the child
determined by blood or adoption, many issues involve persons who
have developed a significant relationship with a child but are not
related by blood or adoption.288
To deal with the question of when parental rights and
responsibilities should be imposed, courts developed the in loco
parentis doctrine.289 In addition to its use in the common law in a
variety of ways, 290 the doctrine has now been codified in some
states for some specific purposes. 291 In Latin, in loco parentis
285. See id. at 21.
286. 'Fantily"and "Household" Use Survey: How Government Agencies Use These
Ternis in Operating Their Programs, REPORT OF THE CALIFORNIA COMMISSION ON
PERSONAL PRIVACY-SUPPLEMENT ONE (1982).
287. See FAMILY DIVERSITY, supra note 270, at 22.
288. See, e.g., Harris v. Lyon, 140 P. 825 (Ariz. 1914) (concerning a former
stepfather of a child who wanted to disavow any parental responsibilities); Alison
D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991) (involving dispute over custody and
visitation rights of a nonbiological mother to her children).
289. A 1940 treatise reported that a United States court first used the in loco
parentis doctrine in 1849. See ADELE STUART MERIAM, THE STEPFATHER IN THE
FAMILY 23-26 (1940) (citing Williams v. Hutchinson, 5 Barb. 122 (N.Y. App. Div.
1849), affd, 3 N.Y. 312 (1850)), cited in MAHONEY, supra note 22, at 17 n.9.
290. The doctrine is of particular importance in resolving issues of child support
and visitation, but has also affected the laws in many states involving issues of
child custody, medical decision making, worker's compensation claims and
wrongful death claims. See MAHONEY, supra note 22, at 105 (wrongful death), 117
(workers' compensation laws), 125-27 (medical decision making), 139-40 (custody);
Bernard J. Berkowitz, Legal Incidents of Today's "Step" Relationship: Cinderella
Revisited, 4 FAM. L.Q. 209, 212-22 (1970) (describing the legal incidents that may
follow from an in loco parentis relationship).
291. Montana uses the in loco parentis approach in its stepchild support statute:
A married person is not bound to support his spouse's children by a former
marriage; but if he receives them into his family and supports them, it is
presumed that he does so as a parent and, where such is the case, they are
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means "in the place of a parent." To stand in loco parentis the
stepparent or other adult must have intended to take the place of
a parent.292 To reach such a finding a court will look, on a case-by-
case basis, for evidence that the adult accepted the child into his or
her household, that the adult supported the child both financially
and emotionally, and that the adult participated in the day-to-day
care of the child.293 The doctrine thus allows a court to give legal
weight to a parent-child relationship that is based on neither
blood nor adoption. 294
A key element of the in loco parentis doctrine is that the
adult voluntarily accepted the status as parent.295 Courts will not
find that an in loco relationship exists if the adult has assumed
some parental duties but does not intend to be treated as a parent
for all purposes. 296  Due to the voluntary nature of the
relationship, either the adult or child can voluntarily terminate an
in loco parentis relationship. The effect is that the adult, who
controls the element of intent, controls the existence of the in loco
parentis relationship at all times. Even if the relationship existed
for a period of time, the adult can choose to terminate the
relationship. 297
The in loco parentis doctrine carries with it both rights and
responsibilities, but does not confer all the rights and
responsibilities of a legal parent on the in loco parentis adult.298
not liable to him for their support nor he to them for their services.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-217 (1997), cited in MAHONEY, supra note 22, at 38.
292. See MAHONEY, supra note 22, at 16-27.
293. See id.; See also Berkowitz, supra note 290; Bryce Levine, Divorce and the
Modern Family: Providing In Loco Parentis Stepparents Standing to Sue for
Custody of Their Stepchildren in a Dissolution Proceeding, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 315,
329-32 (1996).
294. See MAHONEY, supra note 22, at 16-17.
295. See Margaret M. Mahoney, Reformulating the Legal Definition of the
Stepparent-Child Relationship, in STEPFAMILIES: WHO BENEFITS? WHO DOES NOT?
191, 191-96 (Alan Booth & Judith Dunn eds., 1994).
296. See MAHONEY, supra note 22, at 1-18.
297. See Harris v. Lyon, 140 P. 825 (Ariz. 1914) (noting that the in loco parentis
doctrine has no effect on inheritance rights). In Harris, a stepfather cared for his
stepdaughter for five years following the death of his wife, her mother. See id. at
826. When the stepdaughter became the owner of valuable property, the stepfather
sued for reimbursement of his expenses in supporting her. See id. The Arizona
Supreme Court held that he could not be reimbursed for the amounts already
expended because he had been acting in loco parentis. See id. at 829. The fact that
he sued for reimbursement, however, indicated that he no longer intended to act in
loco parentis, and therefore he could receive payment for any future expenditures.
See id. See also MAHONEY, supra note 22, at 17-19 (discussing Harris and the in
loco parentis doctrine).
298. See MAHONEY, supra note 22, at 7-8; David R. Fine & Mark A. Fine,
Learning From Social Sciences: A Model For Reformation of the Laws Affecting
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Courts have used the doctrine to impose support obligations on a
stepparent during the stepparent's marriage to the stepchild's
legal parent. 299 Courts have also used the doctrine to grant
visitation rights to stepparents following the divorce of the
stepparent from the legal parent of the children.3 00
In general, the mere fact of marriage will not make a
stepparent responsible for support of minor stepchildren. A
number of states have, by statute, imposed support obligations on
stepparents under specified circumstances, but the financial rights
of stepchildren are limited.30 1 Some statutes rely on a form of
equitable estoppel, requiring financial support for a child if the
stepparent had voluntarily contributed to the child's support and
the child had relied on that support to the child's detriment. 30 2
Other statutes create a support obligation only for those parents
who have assumed the parental role based on an in loco parentis
standard.303
In states that do not address stepchild support statutorily,
courts have used the in loco parentis doctrine to preclude a
stepparent from seeking reimbursement from a stepchild for funds
provided to the stepchild for support.3 04 If the stepparent intended
to take the place of a parent, then any support provided for the
stepchild followed from the stepparent's status as a parent. 30 5
If divorce terminates the marriage between the stepparent
and the legal parent, the stepparent's support obligations also
terminate. The North Dakota support statute creates a limited
exception, providing that the stepparent must continue to provide
support to the stepchild, as long as the stepchild remains in the
stepparent's "family."30 6 Of course, if the stepparent's role changes
following the divorce, as is usually the case, the statute will not
Stepfanilies, 97 DICK. L. REv. 49, 52 (1992).
299. See, e.g., Schwieter v. Heathman's Estate, 264 S.W.2d 932, 933 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1954), discussed in MAHONEY, supra note 22, at 18.
300. See, e.g., Carter v. Brodrick, 644 P.2d 850 (Alaska 1982), discussed in
MAHONEY, supra note 22, at 133.
301. See MAHONEY, supra note 22, at 38-41.
302. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-217 (1997).
303. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-09 (Supp. 1997); see also Richard S.
Victor et al., Statutory Review of Third-Party Rights Regarding Custody, Visitation,
and Support, 25 FAM. L.Q. 19, 43 (1991) (citing a North Dakota statute that deems
any person standing in loco parentis secondarily liable for the support of a child as
long as the person has voluntarliy assumed the obligation of support).
304. See, e.g., Harris v. Lyon, 140 P. 825 (Ariz. 1914).
305. See MAHONEY, supra note 22, at 16-22.
306. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-09 (Supp. 1997).
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apply. 307 Although the stepparent and stepchild may have had a
parent-child relationship, the law does not impose the same
continuing obligations of support on a stepparent that the law
imposes on legal parents. To the extent a stepchild has rights to
support from a stepparent acting in loco parentis, the stepchild's
rights are viewed as derivative of the marriage.
The doctrine of in loco parentis has been used with increasing
frequency in resolving issues of visitation following divorce, and to
a significantly lesser degree in connection with child custody
cases.308 With respect to child custody cases, a strong preference
for the legal parent persists.3 9 In some states, the court in a
divorce proceeding lacks jurisdiction over custody and visitation
issues involving stepchildren. 310  In those states, the most
convenient forum for seeking custody is unavailable to a
stepparent, regardless of whether a stepparent had been acting in
loco parentis.31 1  Increasingly, however, states are including
stepchild issues in divorce proceedings, either by construing
statutes broadly to include stepchildren or by enacting statutes
that specifically include stepchildren. 312
If the stepparent can proceed with the custody issue, the
stepparent must then compete directly with the legal parent. In
some states, the parental preference applies, permitting third
party custody only if the legal parent is an unfit parent.3 13 In
other states, the stepparent must establish extraordinary reasons
for interfering with the parent-child relationship, 3 4 and in still
other states the best interests of the child standard31 5 focuses on
307. See MAHONEY, supra note 22, at 40.
308. See id. at 137-38; Levine, supra note 293, at 327-29.
309. See Fine & Fine, supra note 298, at 56 ("Almost universally, statutes give a
clear preference to biological parents.").
310. See MAHONEY, supra note 22, at 138-40.
311. See id. at 138.
312. See id. at 137-47; Levine, supra note 293, at 320-23. Cf. Fine & Fine, supra
note 298, at 56-57.
313. See Levine, supra note 293, at 321.
314. See, e.g., Bennett v. Jeffreys, 356 N.E.2d 277 (N.Y. 1976) (requiring a
judicial finding of extraordinary circumstances that would drastically affect the
welfare of the child in order to intervene in the legal parent's right to custody).
315. The best interests of the child standard requires the court to focus on the
child, rather than on the rights of the parents. Developed in response to work done
in the 1970s by psychologists, the best interests of the child standard relies on the
concept of psychological parent. See JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST
INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 17-20 (1973); J. Hammond Muench & Martin R. Levy,
Psychological Parentage: A Natural Right, 13 FAM. L.Q. 129 (1979). The term
psychological parent describes a person who, although not necessarily a child's
legal parent, assumes a parental role in which the psychological parent cares for
the child emotionally as well as physically through day-to-day interaction. See
[Vol. 18:1
CHANGING FAMILIES
the child's interests and places the stepparent and the legal parent
on a level playing field.3 16 The first two approaches start with a
formal definition of parent-blood or adoption-while the third
approach relies on a functional definition, examining the
functioning of both parents with respect to the child. Even the
third approach, however, falls back on the formal definition in
some cases, because courts may believe that maintaining the
relationship with the legal parent is in the best interests of the
child simply because that parent is the child's legal parent.
3 17
Courts are reluctant to interfere with a legal parent's custody
when the contending party is a "third party," so cases granting
custody to a stepparent instead of a legal parent are infrequent.
318
Under most of these statutes, the stepparent is lumped together
with all other third parties, regardless of the nature of the parent-
child relationship.319
Stepparents are likely to have more success obtaining
visitation rights.320  Courts in states that do not authorize
stepparent visitation by statute have used the best interest of the
child standard321 to grant visitation rights.322  Using either
statutory authority or the best interests of the child standard,
courts have authorized visitation for stepparents, 323
GOLDSTEIN, supra, at 19. Many psychologists believe that breaking up the
relationship between a child and his or her psychological parent can be harmful to
the child's emotional development. Id. at 17-20.
316. See e.g., HAw. REV. STAT. § 571-46 (1985 & Supp. 1990). Fine & Fine
describe the Hawaii statute as the "most liberal" of the child custody statutes in
that it allows the best interests standard to take precedence over the parental
preference. See Fine & Fine supra note 298, at 56.
317. See, e.g., Henrikson v. Gable, 412 N.W.2d 702, 703 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987)
(stating "the best interests of the child are served by awarding custody to the
parent.., unless the contrary is established by clear and convincing evidence."),
cited in MAHONEY, supra note 22, at 146-47. Note that the court uses "parent" to
mean legal parent - the formal definition goes unchallenged.
318. See Fine & Fine, supra note 298, at 57. But see Janet Leach Richards, The
Natural Parent Preference Versus Third Parties: Expanding the Definition of
Parent, 16 NOVA L. REv. 733, 739-56 (1992) (describing standards used in some
states to set aside the parental preference).
319. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600.6 (West 1998) (creating preferences for (1)
both biological parents or either biological parent, (2) the person or persons in
whose home the child has been living in a wholesome and stable environment, and
(3) any other person deemed fit).
320. See MAHONEY, supra note 22, at 130-31; Levine, supra note 293, at 327-29.
321. See supra note 315.
322. For an explanation of state rules on stepparent visitation, see Levine, supra
note 293, at 319-20 nn.22-32.
323. See, e.g., Simmons v. Simmons, 486 N.W.2d 788 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (the
statute did not preclude granting visitation to a stepfather); Hickenbottom v.
Hickenbottom, 477 N.W.2d 8 (Neb. 1991) (visitation rights for stepfather were in
the best interests of the child); Spells v. Spells, 378 A.2d 879 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977)
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grandparents, 24  and occasionally others. 325  These courts
determined that the child's interests will be best protected by an
ongoing relationship with the stepparent or other adult who has
cared for the child as a psychological parent. 326
Although stepparents and grandparents have made progress
in obtaining legal recognition of their parent-child relationships,
other family groups have had less success. Martha Minow, for
example, writes eloquently of her involvement in a New York case
that sought visitation rights for a lesbian mother.327
In the case, two women, Alison and Virginia, decided, after
living together for several years, to have a child together.328
According to Alison's petition to the court, the two women
"planned for the conception and birth of the child and agreed to
share jointly all rights and responsibilities of childrearing."329 One
of the women, Virginia, became pregnant through artificial
insemination.330 After the child was born, Virginia and Alison
lived together and cared for the child together.331 Two years later
Virginia and Alison separated, and Alison paid child support and
continued to have frequent contact with the child.332 Two years
after the separation, Virginia began to limit Alison's contacts with
the child and eventually tried to cut off all contact between Alison
and the child, and Alison brought a habeas corpus petition to
obtain visitation rights under a New York statute that allows a
"parent" to petition the court for visitation.333
Alison's lawyers, including Minow, who joined in an amicus
(remanding the case to the trial court with directions to use the best interest of the
child standard in determining whether to permit stepparent visitation); Honaker v.
Burnside, 388 S.E.2d 322 (W. Va. 1989) (best interests standard used to grant
visitation to stepparent).
324. Every state has adopted legislation providing for visitation by
grandparents. See MAHONEY, supra note 22, at 130 (citing Elaine D. Ingulli,
Grandparent Visitation Right" Social Policies and Legal Rights, 87 W. VA. L. REV.
295 (1984-85)).
325. See generally Minow, supra note 14, at 271-72 (describing visitation cases
involving a boyfriend of the mother of the children and a foster parent).
326. See MAHONEY, supra note 22, at 134; Levine, supra note 293, at 327-28.
327. See Minow, supra note 14, at 269.
328. See Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 28 (N.Y. 1991). The court
recited the facts as alleged by the petitioner in her petition, because the facts were





333. See Minow, supra note 14, at 269-70; Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d at
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brief,334 urged the court to adopt a functional definition of "parent"
and to hear Alison's petition for visitation rights because she met
that definition of parent.335 The court refused to extend the
definition of parent beyond the formal definition of someone
"related by blood or adoption," and stated that the definition
proposed by Alison's lawyers could be adopted only by the
legislature. 336 Since Alison was not related to the child by blood or
adoption, she was not a parent and therefore did not have
standing to bring a petition for visitation.3 7 Dissenting Judge
Judith Kaye argued that the legislature had given the
responsibility for defining "parent" to the courts and did not
require the courts to use a restrictive definition.38a
From a child's perspective, if an adult assumes the role of
parent, the child may develop a parent-child relationship with that
adult. The child's definition of parent may be similar to the one
Minow derived by looking at psychological theories of children's
needs: "someone who has taken care of the child on a daily basis, is
known to the child as a parent, and has provided love and
financial support."339 Although Minow raised concerns about
using a functional, rather than formal, definition of parent, she
also stressed the importance of making "family law connect with
334. Brief for the Amicus Curiae, Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1991) (No. 692-88), cited in Minow, supra note 14, at 284 n.51.
335. The brief in which Minow joined proposed that for purposes of section 70(a)
of the New York Domestic Relations Law, the term "parent" should mean:
1) the term "parent" includes a child's biologic or adoptive parent, unless
parental rights have been terminated or otherwise unrecognized by
applicable law.
2) The term "parent" also includes a person who meets the following three
criteria:
a) the person has lived with the child for a substantial portion of the
child's life; and
b) the person has been regularly involved in the day-to-day care,
nurturance, and guidance of the child appropriate to the child's stage
of development; and
c) if the child has also been living with a biologic parent, the biologic
parent has consented to the assumption of a parental role by the
person, and the child has in fact looked to this person as a parent.
Id. at 284 n. 52.
336. See Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d at 29. See also Kogon v. Ulerick,
405 S.E.2d 441 (Va. Ct. App. 1991) (reaching the same result on a request for
visitation by a stepparent). Kogon stated that only the legislature could expand the
right to visitation to "non-parents." See id. at 442.
337. See Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d at 29.
338. Id. at 31. As Judge Kaye points out, the statute at issue uses the term
"parent" without any definitional limitation. "Indeed, [the statute] does not define
the term 'parent' at all. That remains for the courts to do, as often happens when
statutory terms are undefined." See id.
339. Minow, supra note 14, at 274.
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how people really live .... 1340
In a case similar to Alison D. v. Virginia M., a Florida court
held that a lesbian co-parent lacked standing to bring an action for
custody and temporary visitation of her child.341 In the Florida
case, Penny Kazmierazak argued that her status as a
psychological parent put her on "equal footing" with the child's
biological mother for the purposes of determining custody and
child-rearing. 342 The court discussed three cases that granted
visitation or custody to nonbiological parents based on a "best
interest of the child" standard, but determined that these cases did
not create common law rights for psychological parents. 343 The
court discussed Florida's constitutional right of "parental
privacy 344 and concluded that Kazmierazak did not have "rights
equivalent to a biological parent."345 A concurring opinion noted
that a Florida law prohibiting adoption by a homosexual prevents
someone like Kazmierazak from creating a legal relationship with
her child.34 6 Thus, the concurrence acknowledged that under
Florida law a gay man or lesbian cannot create a family that gives
family members legal rights and responsibilities to each other.
Nonetheless, the court refused to grant standing based on status
as a psychological parent, the only status available to
Kazmierazak.
In California, a lesbian co-parent tried a different tactic, but
also lost her bid for visitation.347 After the couple separated in
340. Id. at 271. See also FAMILY DIVERSITY, supra note 270.
341. See Kazmierazak v. Query, 736 So. 2d 106 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)
(holding that an alleged psychological parent-a woman with no biological ties to
the child but claiming to have status equivalent to a biological parent-lacked
parental status equivalent to a biological parent and lacked standing to seek
custody or visitation).
342. See id. at 106.
343. Id. at 108-09 (citing Wills v. Wills, 399 So. 2d 1130 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)
(granting visitation to a stepmother); Simmons v. Pinkey, 587 So. 2d 522 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1991) (granting custody to a foster mother); Heffernan v. Goldman, 256 So.
2d 522 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971) (custody awarded to stepmother despite mother's
petition)).
344. See id. at 109 (discussing Von Eiff v. Azicri, 720 So. 2d 510 (Fla. 1998), and
stating "Von Eiff stands for the proposition that the state cannot intervene into a
parent's fundamental or constitutionally protected right of privacy, either via the
judicial system or legislation, absent a showing of demonstrable harm to the
child").
345. Id.
346. See id. at 111 (Gross, J., concurring specially). See also Music v. Rachford,
654 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (rejecting a lesbian mothers claim that
she was a de facto parent entitled to custody of her non-biological child).
347. See Kathleen C. v. Lisa W., 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 48 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999)
(denying a former partner of the biological mother custody and visitation).
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1990, Lisa, the biological mother, agreed to allow Kathleen, Lisa's
former partner, regular visitation with the two children they had
raised together before their separation. 348 Lisa terminated the
agreement in 1994, but Kathleen surreptitiously visited with the
children on several occasions in early 1996.349 When Lisa learned
of these visits, she sought a court order to prevent Kathleen from
visiting the children. 350  Kathleen responded by seeking
appointment as a guardian of the children with visitation rights.
35
'
The California appellate court affirmed the lower court's finding
that Kathleen could not be appointed a guardian unless the court
found that Lisa's continued custody of the children was
detrimental to them.3 52 The court noted that California appellate
courts have denied several attempts by lesbian co-parents to
obtain legally enforceable visitation with their children, 353 and
concluded that "[tihe issue is one that must be addressed to the
Legislature."354
Although nonbiological co-parents in many states have been
unable to obtain legal recognition of their family relationship with
their children, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
recently permitted a lesbian co-parent to seek custody and
visitation. 355 In E.N.O. v. L.M.M., the court reinstated the
granting of temporary visitation by the probate court,35 6 stating
that the equity jurisdiction of the probate court is broad 357 and
that the probate court had correctly applied the best interest of the
child standard in making its decision.358 In his opinion for the
majority, Justice Abrams stated that the probate judge properly
emphasized the plaintiffs role as a parent of the child:
It is our opinion that he was correct to consider the child's




352. See id. at 50.
353. See id.
354. See id.
355. See E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886 (Mass. 1999) (holding that the
probate court has equity jurisdiction to grant visitation between a child and the
child's de facto parent and that evidence supported the probate court's decision to
grant visitation).
356. The probate court ordered temporary visitation, pending trial. See id. at
886. A single justice of the appellate court granted the biological mother's petition
to vacate the order, and then a single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court of
Suffolk County reinstated visitation. See id. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed
the decision of the single justice. See id.
357. See id at 890.
358. See id. at 892-93.
20001
Law and Inequality
non-traditional family. A child may be a member of a non-
traditional family in which he is parented by a legal parent
and a de facto parent. A de facto parent is one who has no
biological relation to the child, but has participated in the
child's life as a member of the child's family.359
Justice Abrams noted further, "[tihe recognition of de facto parents
is in accord with notions of the modern family."360
In E.N.O. v. L.M.M., the Probate Judge and the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts recognized the reality of the
family the two women had created with their son. The court noted
that a legal parent does have constitutional rights to custody of
her child,36 1 but that the legal parent's right is not absolute and
must be balanced with the child's interest in maintaining a
relationship with the child's de facto parent, a best interests of the
child approach. 362 Justice Abrams explained, "[t]he family that
must be accorded respect in this case is the family formed by the
plaintiff, the defendant, and the child."3 63 Thus, the case reflects
the importance of family relationships for a child, regardless of
whether the child's family is "traditional" or "non-traditional."
This case, as well as the cases in other states that refuse to create
parental rights for de facto or psychological parents, demonstrate
the need for laws that respect all families.
3. Housing Issues
In a different setting, construing the term "family" rather
than "parent," the New York Court of Appeals did use a functional
definition. In Braschi v. Stahl Associates,364 the court was asked
to interpret the New York City Rent and Eviction Regulations.
That statute provides that a landlord cannot evict "any member of
the tenant's family, as defined in paragraph (3) of this
subdivision."3 6 5  The statute goes on to define family member
359. See id. at 891.
360. See id.
361. See id. at 893 (explaining that a fit, legal parent has a fundamental right to
custody of her child, founded on a liberty interest in the Fourteenth Amendment of
the federal constitution and the due process clause of the state constitution, and
citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (finding a violation of equal
protection by an Illinois statute which failed to give an unmarried father a hearing
to determine fitness for custody, while granting such hearing to unmarried
mothers, married parents and divorced parents); Opinion of the Justices, 691
N.E.2d 911 (Mass. 1998) (finding the state's interest in protecting children from
abuse outweighed deprivation of parental due process right)).
362. See id.
363. See id.
364. 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989).
365. N.Y. City Rent and Eviction Regulations, N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit.
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broadly as "any other person.., who can prove emotional and
financial commitment, and interdependence between such person
and the tenant."366 Petitioner, Miguel Braschi, argued that the
statute applied to him, as a member of the family of Leslie
Blanchard, his deceased committed partner.3 67
In interpreting the term "family" as used in the eviction
statute, the court refused to use a narrow, formal definition of
family that limits the term to persons related by blood or
adoption. 36 Because the statute did not define the term, the court
concluded that the legislature had left to the court the task of
construing the word "family."369 In so doing, the court looked to
legislative intent, specifically, the legislative purpose in enacting
the rent control and eviction statute.370 The court concluded that
since the purpose of the statute was to protect tenants,
particularly "[flamily members, whether or not related by blood, or
law who have always treated the apartment as their family
home"371 from the hardship of eviction. The court stated that this
protection for tenants "should not rest on fictitious legal
distinctions or genetic history, but instead should find its
foundation in the reality of family life." 372 In the court's view, an
appropriate definition of family included "two adult lifetime
partners whose relationship is long term and characterized by an
emotional and financial commitment and interdependence." 373
The court cited dictionary definitions of family in support of its
conclusion.374
4. Wrongful Death and Worker's Compensation
Other areas of the law have taken a functional approach to
defining who merits the protection of the statute, fine-tuned to the
purpose of the particular statute. Many, but not all, wrongful
death statutes now include stepchildren as potential claimants. 375
9, § 2204.6(d) (1984).
366. See id.
367. See Braschi, 543 N.E.2d at 51.
368. Respondent argued that the court should construe the term consistent with
the New York intestacy laws, limiting family members to those related by blood,
consanguinity and adoption. See id. at 52-53.
369. See id. at 52.
370. See id. at 52-53.
371. See id. at 54.
372. See id. at 53.
373. See id. at 54 (This view comports both with our society's traditional concept
of 'family' and with the expectations of individuals who live in such nuclear units.").
374. See id.
375. See Engel, supra note 106, at 361-62 (arguing that a stepchild's rights
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Some of the statutes include stepchildren in the list of those
covered by the statute.376 Other wrongful death statutes use
dependency as the determining factor, enabling a stepchild who
was dependent on the decedent to bring a claim under those
statutes.377 A few statutes permit a claim by a stepchild only if no
primary beneficiaries exist.378
Workers compensation laws provide benefits to dependents of
an injured worker. The Oregon statute includes "a child toward
whom the worker stands in loco parentis... and a stepchild, if
such stepchild was, at the time of the injury, a member of the
worker's family and substantially dependent upon the worker for
support."379 By basing the statute on persons who are actually
dependent on the injured worker, the statute takes a functional
approach that makes sense in light of the purpose behind the
statute-replacing financial support lost due to the injury.
The cases in this Section IV demonstrate that some areas of
the law have begun to recognize the reality of American families.
Courts and legislatures have taken a functional approach to
determine what constitutes a family and what legal rights and
responsibilities should follow from a person's role in a family. The
in loco parentis doctrine, the best interest of the child standard, a
definition of family that includes lifetime partners, and a
definition of parents that includes de facto parents are all ways in
which laws have begun to address the problem of creating a legal
definition of family.
IV. Reform Efforts in Intestacy Laws
Even though the laws in some areas are beginning to address
questions of the changing nature of family, albeit slowly, there
have been few changes in intestacy law. The Official Comments to
the 1990 Uniform Probate Code (UPC) explain that "ease of
administration and predictability of result are prized features of
under wrongful death statutes should depend on the best interests of the child, and
not on "some outdated conception of family relations which fails to account for step-
relationships").
376. See Engel, supra note 106, at 361 nn.415-18 (citing CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §
377.60 (West 1991); IDAHO CODE § 5-311 (1997); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.20.020
(West 1988)).
377. See id. (citing ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.580 (Michie 1998); ARK. CODE ANN. §
16-62-102(d) (Michie 1987); HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-3 (1998)).
378. See id. (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3724 (1989); MD. CODE ANN., CTS.
& JUD. PROC. § 3-904 (1998)).
379. OR. REV. STAT. § 656.005(5) (1989).
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the probate system . -.380 Perhaps it is in part this desire for
certainty in probate law that makes change in this area so
difficult, particularly change which requires some exercise of
discretion on the part of the probate judge. The difficulty of
creating a scheme of intestate distribution in the face of the
multitude of family combinations cannot be underestimated, yet
neither can the need to change an intestate system that
increasingly fails to make sense in view of the ways families live.
Other areas of the law have begun to come to terms with the
issues; probate law must face these questions as well.
Intestacy laws have changed in the past to respond to societal
changes. Adopted children and illegitimate children are now
included as "children" under the statutes. 38 ' Equitable adoption
has been used occasionally to permit distribution of an intestate
share to a child not related to the decedent by blood or adoption,
although equitable adoption is rarely successful and is unavailable
for stepchildren.38 2 In a few states, stepchildren can receive an
intestate share if the alternative is escheat to the state 8 3 That is,
the stepchildren will inherit only if no relatives by blood or
adoption exist.38 4 Now, increasing changes in the structure of
families require greater changes.
A. The Hawaii and California Statutes
Two states have in recent years attempted to expand their
380. UNIF. PROBATE CODE art. II, pt. 2 (1993) (explaining the decision to use a
mechanically determined elective share rather than an elective share that would
require judicial discretion in determining whether property held by the spouses
was marital property or separate property).
381. See supra notes 199-201 and accompanying text.
382. See supra notes 244-252 and accompanying text.
383. In Connecticut, Maryland, Ohio and South Carolina, if a decedent left no
other heirs, then the decedent's stepchildren and their descendants can take. See
MAHONEY, supra note 22, at 57. In Arkansas, California, Florida, Iowa, Kentucky,
Missouri, Nevada, Rhode Island, Virginia and West Virginia, if a decedent left no
other heirs, the heirs of the decedent's spouse can take. See id. The heirs of the
decedent's spouse may be the decedent's stepchildren. See id. The Washington
statute provides that the decedent's property will go to the spouse's descendants,
but only to the extent that the decedent had received the property from the spouse.
See id. at 57-58. Still another version, in Iowa, gives property to the heirs of the
decedent's parents-who may include a stepparent of the decedent. See id. at 58.
384. Statutes look for relatives at least as far removed as descendants of the
decedent's grandparents, so a first cousin or a grandnephew will take before a
stepchild can take. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 112.045 (1999). Many states prefer
not to limit intestate takers to descendants of grandparents, so the relative who
takes an intestate share may be even farther removed. See DUKEMINIER &
JOHANSON, supra note 4, at 89 (The UPC limitation on inheritance [descendants of
grandparents] has met with considerable resistance in legislatures.").
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intestate statutes beyond the "blood, marriage or adoption" rule.
These two statutory changes, Hawaii's reciprocal beneficiary Act38 5
and California's intestate share for stepchildren, 386 both take a
formal approach in defining the new family members. The Hawaii
statute creates a new status, reciprocal beneficiary, that can be
obtained by following specified registration procedures. 3 7 The Act
creating the new status takes pains to distinguish the status from
marriage, but the Act does give reciprocal beneficiaries many of
the benefits of marriage, including an intestate share equal to the
share a spouse would receive. 388 By creating a formal category,
the legislature avoids the issue of judicial discretion. The process
is entirely self-selecting. Any two people who meet the statute's
requirements can register and become each other's intestate
heirs.38 9 Of course, for those couples who fail to register, the new
statute provides no relief.
In 1983, California became the first state to create an
intestate share for stepchildren regardless of whether other heirs
exist.390 The California statute was narrowly drawn, and the
California Supreme Court has interpreted the statute restrictively,
so its potential application is extremely limited. 39 1 The California
statute treats a stepchild or foster child392 as a "child" of the
decedent for purposes of the intestate distribution if certain
criteria are met.393  The California statute creates three
385. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 572C (1998).
386. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 6454 (West 1991 & Supp. 1999).
387. See supra text accompanying notes 226-232.
388. See supra text accompanying notes 226-232.
389. One requirement is that the two persons be adults who are legally
prohibited from marrying each other. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 572C-2 (1998). The
Statute explains that this includes family members related by blood as well as
same-sex couples. See id. It is interesting to note that the new status is not
available to a stepparent and stepchild unless the two are both male or both
female. See supra text accompanying notes 227-232 (discussing statutory
requirements for reciprocal beneficiaries).
390. California's statute creates a share for qualified stepchildren regardless of
whether other heirs exist. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 6454 (West 1991 & Supp. 1999).
391. See Estate of Joseph, 949 P.2d 472, 475 (Cal. 1998) (citing Tent.
Recommendation Relating to Wills and Intestate Succession (Nov. 1982), 16 Cal.
Law Revision Com. Rep. 2318, 2319 (1982)).
392. The California statute uses the terms "step-child and foster child." This
Article will use stepchild, but the reader should be aware that the statute also
applies to foster children.
393. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 6454 (West 1991 & Supp. 1999). The statute states
the following-
For the purpose of determining intestate succession by a person or the
person's issue from or through a foster parent or stepparent, the
relationship of parent and child exists between that person and the
person's foster parent or stepparent if both of the following requirements
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requirements: (1) that a parent-child relationship begin while the
child is a minor, (2) that the parent-child relationship continue
throughout the joint lifetimes of the child and parent and (3) the
parent would have adopted the child but for a legal barrier.
394
This last requirement, as construed by the California Supreme
Court,395 has created a nearly insurmountable stumbling block for
many stepchildren.
The statute does not define "parent-child relationship,"
presumably leaving that determination to the courts, but the other
requirements make determining the quality of the relationship
less necessary. The statute requires that the stepchild prove by
clear and convincing evidence that the stepparent would have
adopted the stepchild but for a legal barrier. That evidence will
establish that in the parent's view a parent-child relationship did
exist and the parent wanted to formalize that relationship through
adoption. Thus, the California statute takes an approach similar
to equitable adoption but does not require that the child prove the
existence of a contract. The California statute applies more
broadly than equitable adoption, because equitable adoption
generally will not work in a stepfamily composed of remarried
spouses and their children.396
The idea to expand the intestate heirs to include stepchildren
under limited circumstances grew out of a project conducted by the
California Law Revision Commission. In its report to the
legislature, the Commission stated its purpose was to create rules
in light of the changing American family that would be more likely
to implement the intent of an intestate decedent.397 The initial
recommendation from the Commission to the legislature did not
include the stepfamily provision.398 That provision was added
later, apparently with input from Professor Edward C. Halbach,
Jr., an expert consultant to the Commission. 399  Professor
are satisfied: (a) The relationship began during the person's minority and
continued throughout the joint lifetimes of the person and the person's
foster parent or stepparent. (b) It is established by clear and convincing
evidence that the foster parent or stepparent would have adopted the
person but for a legal barrier.
Id.
394. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 6454 (West 1991 & Supp. 1999).
395. See Estate of Joseph, 949 P.2d at 477.
396. See supra text accompanying notes 251-252.
397. See Estate of Joseph, 949 P.2d at 475.
398. In fact, the initial recommendation specifically excluded a stepchild from
the definition of child and stepparent from the definition of parent. See Cal. Law
Revision Com. on Prob. Code § 6408, cited in Estate of Joseph, 949 P.2d at 476.
399. See Estate of Joseph, 949 P.2d at 476.
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Halbach's notes indicate that the new section would "provide for
step- and foster children in very limited situations, with the
necessary safeguards incorporated by treating the case like an
adoption, for which qualifications, exceptions, etc. are elsewhere
worked out."400
Thus, although the Commission's charge was to consider the
"changes in the American family,"401 the new statute provides a
share for a stepchild only in a situation that was as close as
possible to adoption-the child must have evidence that the
stepparent wanted to adopt the child but could not legally do so. 402
The legislative history points out that the statute would cover a
child who would have been adopted by the stepparent but for the
refusal of the biological parent to give consent.40 3 The statute
reflects the priority given to adoption in establishing a legal
parent-child bond, but recognizes that in a stepfamily situation the
stepparent may be precluded from adopting the stepchild because
the biological parent refuses to consent to the adoption.
The California statute does not attempt to incorporate new
family structures, but rather seeks to squeeze the new family
structures into existing rules. A stepparent-stepchild relationship
may be significant and worthy of recognition regardless of whether
the stepparent seeks to adopt the stepchild. Indeed, it may be in
the stepchild's best interests to maintain ties to both families. An
adoption, either before or after the child attains the age of
majority, may be inappropriate or unnecessary even if it becomes
legally possible.
The question of what sort of relationship was necessary to
show a parent-child relationship has not been discussed by the
courts.404 Rather, the courts have focused on the requirement that
400. Id. (citing the records of the Law Revision Commission, specifically a two
page document entitled "March '83 ECH-Notes," apparently the notes of Professor
Halbach).
401. Id. at 475.
402. See id.
403. See Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Rep. on Assem. Bills No. 25 & 68 (1983-1984
Reg. Sess.) 3 Sen. J. 4882 (1983-1984 Reg. Sess.), cited in Estate of Joseph, 949
P.2d at 475.
404. See Estate of Claffey, 257 Cal. Rptr. 197, 198-199 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989)
(holding that in a stepparent to stepchild relationship the term "relationship"
within the meaning of the intestate inheritance statute contemplates a relationship
like that of natural parent and child in the sense of family relationship). The
Claffey opinion stressed the importance of finding that a family relationship existed
between the deceased stepmother and two stepchildren. Jury instructions
described the relationship required by the statute as a "parent and child family
relationship," but provided no further guidance regarding the nature of the
relationship. See id. at 198.
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a legal barrier to adoption existed and that the stepparent would
otherwise have adopted the child. In the first reported case
applying the statute, Estate of Stevenson,40 5 the court interpreted
this requirement to mean that the legal barrier existed during the
child's minority.40 6  Although the legal barrier-the biological
parent's refusal to consent to an adoption-would no longer exist
after the child became an adult, the court stated that requiring a
legal barrier at all times during the joint lives of the parties would
exclude nearly all stepchildren from the scope of the statute.
40 7
This, the court concluded, "would not make sense."40 8
In a subsequent case, Estate of Cleveland,40 9 the court
disagreed with the Stevenson court and held that the legal barrier
had to exist at all times until the death of the decedent
stepparent. 410 This decision created a split between the Second
District and the Sixth District.
Finally, in Estate of Joseph,4 11 the California Supreme Court
agreed with the decision in Cleveland and interpreted the statute
to mean that the legal barrier must persist until the stepparent
dies. 41 2  Associate Justice Chin's dissent that such an
interpretation renders the statute "virtually inapplicable to adult
foster children or stepchildren, who seldom (if ever) could
demonstrate a lifetime legal barrier to adoption" failed to sway the
court.
4 13
In Estate of Joseph the majority argued that section 6454
should not be read to require a barrier to adoption only at the time
adoption was considered or attempted, but rather to mean that the
barrier must continue throughout the joint lifetimes of the
stepparent and the stepchild. 414  The court stated that this
determination was "consistent with the words [the section]
uses."4 15 The court also stated that its interpretation conformed
with the purpose of passing an intestate estate in accordance with
405. 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 250 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
406. See id. at 257.
407. See id. ("lit must appear that the legal barrier existed when the parties
attempted adoption. It is not necessary that the legal barrier exist until the time
the stepparent dies.").
408. Id.
409. 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 590 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
410. See id.
411. 949 P.2d 472 (Cal. 1998).
412. See id.
413. lid. at 482.




the likely intent of the intestate decedent "to do so in an 'efficient
and expeditious' manner."416 The dissent argued that the majority
opinion is not consistent with the words of the statute and instead
that the majority added to the statute the requirement that a
"continuous, lifetime legal barrier to adoption (and a continuous,
lifetime intent to adopt)" exist.417
In addition to the words of the statute, both the majority and
the dissent looked to the legislative intent in adopting the statute.
The legislature intended that the statute apply to a stepparent-
stepchild relationship in which the stepparent would have adopted
the stepchild but for the biological parent's refusal to give
consent.418 The dissent reasoned that since the majority's
interpretation precludes most stepchildren from meeting the
requirements of section 6454, the better interpretation was to
require that the barrier exist only during the child's minority. 419
The majority countered by stating that the legislature's intent was
to apply the statute "only in exceptional circumstances. 4 20
Although the language of the statute may be susceptible of
two interpretations, the court's reliance on the decedent's intent is
misplaced. The court quoted approvingly from the probate court's
opinion:
Cleveland... envisioned just such a case as this when it
recognized that any number of reasons could exist for not
wanting a 'foster child' to succeed to one's property including
loss of affection, disappointment, favoring relatives,
dissatisfaction with the choice of the 'foster child's' spouse, to
name but a few. 421
The same can, of course, be true for a child related to the parent by
416. Id. at 478-79 (citing Tent. Recommendation Relating to Wills and Intestate
Succession, 16 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. 2319 (Nov. 1982)).
417. Id. at 483.
418. See id. at 473.
419. See id. at 488.
420. Id. at 480. The court does note that in 1997 the California Law Revision
Commission proposed that the legislature amend California Probate Code § 6454 to
provide that the legal barrier need exist only at the time at which adoption was
contemplated or attempted. See id. at 479-80. That is, the Commission would
continue the requirement that the stepparent would have adopted the stepchild but
for a legal barrier, but would not require that a stepparent adopt the stepchild after
the stepchild attained the age of majority in order to make the stepchild an heir.
See id. The court commented that the proposal did not reflect legislative intent
with respect to the statute as it exists, but rather was a Commission
recommendation for legislative change. See id. at 480. One could argue that the
Commission's proposal is necessary merely to clarify its - and the legislature's -
intent in the face of the decisions that require the legal barrier to continue
throughout a stepchild's life.
421. Id. at 474.
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blood or adoption. The court ignored the complexity of modern
families, stating that "the foster child or stepchild might have been
a friend to the foster parent or stepparent. But a friend, as such,
is not an heir."422 The majority's opinion found, in the existence of
an ongoing legal barrier, evidence of the decedent's likely intent to
leave property to a stepchild, while the absence of a legal barrier
led the court to assume that, at best, the stepparent and the
stepchild maintained a friendly relationship. 423 Given the failure
of many people to take the necessary legal step of writing a will to
deal with property matters, it seems likely that the same people
will not take the legal step of adopting a child once the child is an
adult, regardless of the closeness of the parent-child relationship.
To infer a closer relationship simply because a legal barrier exists
makes no sense. Rather, the court should look to the relationship
itself. As the dissent pointed out, the statute already requires that
a parent-child relationship exist throughout the joint lifetimes of
the stepparent and the stepchild. 424 The court should look for the
existence of that relationship, rather than the existence of a
continuing legal barrier. The court's opinion in Joseph, therefore,
leaves the future of the stepfamily statute to the legislature.
B. Responses to the California Statute
Even before the California Supreme Court's decision in
Joseph, two law review articles criticized the statute for not going
far enough. Margaret Mahoney's article proposes modifications to
the California statute that take a more functional approach in
defining a stepchild for purposes of the intestacy statute.
425
Although expanding the definition of child for intestate purposes
to a small degree, the California statute, with its emphasis on the
decedent stepparent's intent to adopt coupled with a legal barrier
to adoption, continues to take a formal approach to the definition
of child for intestacy purposes. Under the statute, a child is one
who would have been adopted but for the legal barrier.426
Although the formal step of adoption had not been taken, the
parent must have come as close as possible.427
Mahoney, taking a functional approach, proposes an intestate
422. Id. at 478.
423. See id.
424. See id. at 484.
425. See Mahoney, supra note 195.
426. See supra note 375.
427. See supra text accompanying notes 402-403.
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share for children who meet several requirements.42s Mahoney
states, "the standard for inheritance by stepparents and
stepchildren must involve proof of the stepmarriage plus proof of
the de facto family relationship between the nonparent spouse and
the children of the other spouse."429 Mahoney would require that
the stepfamily be formed during the child's minority, as is required
under the California statute.430 Rather than using the "would
have adopted.., but for a legal barrier" test used by the
California statute,43' Mahoney proposes using the common law in
loco parentis doctrine 432 to determine whether a de facto family
relationship existed.4 33 Mahoney points out that because use of
the doctrine is well developed in family law, the doctrine could also
be used in the intestacy context.4 34 The in loco parentis analysis
focuses on a relationship that formed during a child's minority.435
Mahoney would require that the relationship continued
throughout the joint lifetimes of the parties. The California
statute also contains this requirement of an ongoing
relationship. 436 Although the statute limits the intestate rights
created under the stepfamily statute to inheritance by a stepchild
from a stepparent, Mahoney would extend the rights to
inheritance by the stepparent from the stepchild and inheritance
by descendants of a predeceased stepchild from the stepparent.437
A second critique of the California statute agrees with
Mahoney that the California statute's mechanism for determining
the existence of a relationship that qualifies for an intestate share,
the "would have adopted... but for a legal barrier" test, is too
narrow. 438  In his article, Thomas Hanson concludes that
Mahoney's in loco parentis approach is also underinclusive. 439
428. See Mahoney, supra note 195, at 929.
429. Id.
430. See id.
431. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6454 (West 1991 & Supp. 1999).
432. See supra text accompanying notes 289-294 (explaining that the in loco
parentis doctrine uses evidence, such as whether the child and parent live in the
same household, whether the parent performs household services for the child and
whether the parent supports the child, both financially and emotionally, to
determine whether a parent-child relationship exists).
433. See Mahoney, supra note 195, at 931-32.
434. See id.
435. See id. at 932.
436. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 6454.
437. See Mahoney, supra note 195, at 933-34.
438. See Thomas M. Hanson, Intestate Succession for Stepchildren: California
Leads the Way, But Has It Gone Far Enough?, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 257, 270 (1995).
439. See id. at 283-84.
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Hanson suggests that a better approach is to make the sole
statutory requirement proof "by a preponderance of evidence that
a legitimate family relationship existed between the decedent and
the stepchild."440 Hanson suggests using presumptions to aid the
court in determining whether a legitimate family relationship
exists. 441
Although Hanson's article raises a number of good points, the
author does not address the difficulty of putting a significant
amount of discretion in the hands of the probate judge. It is this
balancing of discretion and equitable results that makes crafting
an appropriate statute so difficult and forms the basis for
Mahoney's more limited approach.
C. Proposal for De Facto Partners
Although no state legislature has adopted the idea, a
proposal by Lawrence Waggoner takes a functional approach in
creating an intestate share for a committed partner. 442
Waggoner's proposed statute provides that if a decedent dies
unmarried and without a valid will, the decedent's "de facto
partner" will be entitled to an intestate share. 443 To be considered
a de facto partner, the survivor must meet four requirements,
which are that the decedent and the surviving partner:
(1) must not have been related by blood in a manner that would have
precluded them from marrying each other under state law; (2) must, at
the decedent's death, have been unmarried; (3) must then have been
regularly living together in the same household; and (4) must then have
been in a relationship that was marriage-like. 444
The first three requirements are bright-line tests, although
the requirement that the partners have been regularly living
together may require some guidelines concerning partners who
maintain two households for work-related reasons. 445 These three
tests operate more like a formal approach, although the status
considered is a negative status due to the language not related by
blood and not married. The fourth, and most important, test takes
a functional approach and requires that the petitioner establish
the existence of a de facto partner relationship between the
decedent and the surviving partner-that they lived in a
440. See id. at 279.
441. See id. at 283-84.
442. See Waggoner, supra note 3, at 79-80.
443. See id. at 80.
444. Id. at 81.




To guide the court in making a determination as to whether
the relationship was "marriage-like," the proposed statute does
two things. First, the statute provides a nonexclusive list of
factors for the court to consider. 446 The court must balance these
factors to determine the nature of the relationship between the
decedent and the surviving partner. Waggoner explains that he
derived the factors from case law. 447 Many of the factors can be
established by objective evidence, for example whether the couple
went through a marriage ceremony or had children together,
which will make proving the existence of the relationship easier.
Second, the statute also creates presumptions that, if
specified circumstances exist, will shift the burden of proof from
the surviving de facto partner to the heirs who will otherwise take
the intestate estate. 448 For example, a presumption that the
relationship was marriage-like exists if: (a) the decedent and the
partner lived together for periods totalling at least five years
during the six-year period preceding the decedent's death, (b) the
decedent and the partner registered as domestic partners or (c) if
the partner is the parent of a minor child of the decedent who lived
with the decedent.449  Waggoner explains that the use of
presumptions like these should reduce litigation. 450
Waggoner's proposal makes a substantial contribution to the
discussion of ways in which intestate laws can adapt to changing
family structures. By combining formal and functional
approaches, Waggoner minimizes the costs of increased litigation
446. See id. at 79-80.
Among the factors to be considered in determining whether a relationship
is marriage-like are the following: (1) the purpose, duration, constancy,
and exclusivity of the relationship; (2) the degree to which the parties
pooled their financial resources, such as by maintaining joint checking or
other types of account, sharing a mortgage or lease on the household in
which they lived or on other property, titling the household in which they
lived or other property in joint tenancy, or naming the other as primary
beneficiary of life insurance or employee benefit plans; (3) the procreation
or adoption of children and the degree of mutual care and support given
them; (4) whether the couple went through a marriage ceremony; and (5)
the degree to which the couple held themselves out to others as married or
the degree to which the couple held themselves out to others as
emotionally and financially committed to one another on a permanent
basis, as exhibited by their acknowledging mutual rights, duties, and
obligations toward one another.
Id.
447. See id. at 83.
448. See id. at 80.
449. See id.
450. See id. at 83.
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and uncertainty of moving from a status-based statute to a statute
dependent on establishing the quality of a relationship. The
proposal provides useful ideas for thinking about ways to modify
intestacy laws in order to bring non-legal children into the
intestate scheme.
D. The Dilemma of Discretion
In the United States, probate law in general and intestacy
laws in particular have long relied on fixed rules and limited
discretion.451 By contrast, a system developed in New Zealand
452
and now in use in the states of Australia, in England and in most
of the Canadian provinces provides for a substantial degree of
judicial discretion. 453 Testator's family maintenance provides that
the court can rearrange the decedent's estate plan, either an
intestate distribution 454 or a will, pursuant to a petition by any
person provided for under the statute.
455
Initially, and still the case in some jurisdictions, 456 the
statutes protected the decedent's spouse and children. In 1975,
the English statute was expanded to include not only the
decedent's spouse and children, but also a former spouse who had
not remarried, a stepchild, if the stepchild was treated as a child
by the decedent, and any other person who was being maintained
by the decedent at the time of the decedent's death.457 Thus, the
451. See Mary Ann Glendon, Fied Rules and Discretion in Contemporary
Family Law and Succession Law, 60 TuL. L. REV. 1165, 1185 (1986) (referring to
succession law as "the traditional stronghold of fixed rules").
452. See Testator's Family Maintenance Act of 1900, N.Z. Stat., No. 20 (1900)
(enacting the first testators family maintenance statute in 1900).
453. For a history of testator's family maintenance, see W.D. MACDONALD,
FRAUD ON THE WIDOW'S SHARE (1960); Joseph Dainow, Restricted Testation in New
Zealand, Australia and Canada, 36 MICH. L. REV. 1107, 1111-15 (1938). See also
Deborah A. Batts, I Didn't Ask to Be Born: The American Law of Disinheritance
and a Proposal For Change to a System of Protected Inheritance, 41 HASTINGS L.J.
1197, 1213-16 (1990); Ralph C. Brashier, Disinheritance and the Modern Family, 45
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 83, 121-33 (1994); Joseph Laufer, Flexible Restraints on
Testamentary Freedom-A Report on Decedents'Family Maintenance Legislation, 69
HARV. L. REV. 277, 288-94 (1955).
454. The statutes are sometimes more accurately referred to as "decedent's
family maintenance" because the court can alter intestate distribution, as well as a
decedent's testamentary plans. See Laufer, supra note 453.
455. See generally N.Z. Stat., No. 20 (describing New Zealand statute).
456. See, e.g., Wills Variation Act, R.S.B.C., ch. 435, § 2(1) (1979) (Can.) ("[T]he
court may, in its discretion, in an action by or on behalf of the wife, husband or
children, order that the provision that it thinks adequate, just and equitable in the
circumstances be made out of the estate of the testator for the wife, husband or
children.").
457. Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependents) Act, 1975, ch. 63 § 1.-(1).
(Eng.), cited in Batts, supra note 453, at 1215 n.97. The statute provides for the
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English statute specifically contemplates stepchildren, regardless
of whether the decedent was married to the child's legal parent at
the time of the decedent's death.
The English statute permits persons for whom the
distributive share was inadequate or nonexistent to apply for a
"reasonable financial provision."458 For applicants other than the
surviving spouse, this term includes only amounts reasonable for
maintenance. 459 For the surviving spouse, amounts beyond those
necessary for maintenance must be "reasonable." 460  The
additional flexibility for the surviving spouse was added to the law
in 1975 as a way of providing for the marital property rights of the
surviving spouse.46 1
The general idea behind testator's family maintenance is to
provide support for family members who were dependent on the
decedent before the decedent's death.462 Courts, however, likely
will use the statute to rearrange a testator's distributive scheme
under a will to fit the court's normative expectations. 463 The
Supreme Court of Canada, interpreting the requirement under the
British Columbia statute that the court make such distribution as
is "adequate, just and equitable,"464 explicitly directed courts to
consider both legal and moral obligations in determining whether
to grant a petition for a distribution.465 Given this gloss on the
statute and the general lack of specific guidelines in the statutes,
one commentator has described testator's family maintenance as
following categories of potential applicants:
(a) the wife or husband of the deceased;
(b) a former wife or former husband of the deceased who has not
remarried;
(c) a child of the deceased;
(d) any person (not being a child of the deceased) who, in the case of any
marriage to which the deceased was at any time a party, was treated by
the deceased as a child of the family in relation to that marriage;
(e) any person (not being a person included in the foregoing paragraphs of
this subsection) who immediately before the death of the deceased was
being maintained, either wholly or partly, by the deceased ....
Id.
458. Batts, supra note 453, at 1215-16.
459. See Brashier, supra note 453, at 123 n.133.
460. See id.
461. See id.
462. See id. at 122.
463. See Melanie B. Leslie, The Myth of Testamentary Freedom, 38 ARIZ. L. REV.
235 (1996).
464. Wills Variation Act, R.S.B.C, ch. 435, § 2(1) (1979) (Can.); see also supra
text accompanying note 456.
465. Walker v. McDermott, 1931 S.C.R. 94, 96 (Can.), discussed in Leslie, supra
note 463, at 271 n.194 and accompanying text.
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permitting the judge to operate in a "highly discretionary
manner."
4 66
Periodically, an American scholar recommends the adoption
of testator's family maintenance in the United States.46 7 The idea
has never caught hold here, however, perhaps because of a desire
for certainty and perhaps due to the structure of the probate court
system.468 The high level of discretion involved in testator's family
maintenance is of particular concern when the decedent's will is
altered.469 Given the great emphasis placed on testamentary
intent in the United States,470 changes to a decedent's will, absent
evidence of lack of capacity or undue influence, are suspect.
471
With respect to intestate distribution, however, no direct evidence
of the decedent's intent exists. Perhaps with respect to intestacy,
then, some degree of judicial discretion is acceptable. Nonetheless,
the use of discretion in the probate context should be approached
with caution given the experience with the discretionary
application of the doctrine of undue influence.
Any aspect of probate law that injects judicial discretion into
the distribution of a decedent's property may create problems for
persons whose behavior and family structure do not fit the
prevailing social norms. Undue influence is notorious as a tool
used to undo a will that does not meet society's approved
distributive pattern.472  If a testator makes testamentary
466. Brashier, supra note 453, at 124-25; see also Leslie, supra note 463, at 272-
73 ("[Clourts in British Columbia are required to rely on their interpretation of
societal norms in determining whether to give effect to testamentary intent.").
467. See MACDONALD, supra note 453; Laufer, supra note 453, at 313.
468. See Glendon, supra note 451, at 1186.
469. See Brashier, supra note 453, at 124-33 ("The judicial discretion afforded by
the testators family maintenance system is the modern commonwealth remedy to
the difficult problem of balancing testamentary freedom with moral obligation to
protect and provide for one's spouse and children....").
470. See supra note 28; see also Brashier, supra note 453, at 133-34.
471. See Brashier, supra note 453, at 133; Glendon, supra note 432, at 1191
(advocating against expanded use of judicial discretion in probate because
"discretionary provision... ignores the intent of the testator, promotes intrafamily
litigation, depletes estates, and brings disarray into a relatively smooth functioning
area of the law").
472. See Joseph W. deFuria, Jr., Testamentary Gifts Resulting from Meretricious
Relationship& Undue Influence or Natural Beneficence?, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
200, 202-07 (1989); Gary, supra note 46, at 418-21; Leslie, supra note 463, at 243-
58 (reporting the results of a survey of contested wills over a five-year period and
concluding that "the presumption in favor of family members generally can be
overcome only where the court views the testator's reason for disinheriting
relatives as morally acceptable"); Jeffrey G. Sherman, Undue Influence and the
Honwsexual Testator, 42 U. PiTT. L. REV. 225 (1981); E. Gary Spitko, Gone But Not
Conforming: Protecting the Abhorrent Testator from Majoritarian Cultural Norms
Through Minority-Culture Arbitration, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 275, 275 n.1, 282-
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dispositions to persons outside the societal definition of the
"natural objects of testator's bounty,"473  disinherited blood
relatives may charge that those persons unduly influenced the
testator.474 In some cases, courts appear to find undue influence
based on disapproval of the relationship between the testator and
the beneficiary. 475
The undue influence doctrine allows the judge or jury to
impose its own norms on the testator's dispositive plans. For
example, a court may find that a younger man unduly influenced
an older woman, who happened to be his lover, into leaving her
property to him because the court had difficulty imagining love
between the two. 476 In addition, same-sex couples face attack on
their wills by family members who may be unhappy both about
being disinherited and about the decedent's homosexuality. 477 In
these situations, the decedent executed a will in conformance with
his or her own notions of family. If the decedent's sense of family
does not conform with a societal notion of family, the court may
use a finding of undue influence to disrupt the testator's
86, 294-95 (1999) (explaining that the trier of fact in a will contest is more likely to
disrupt an estate plan that does not follow social norms and recommending that
minority testators-persons "whose core religious, political or social values and
beliefs differ meaningfully and substantially from majoritarian norms," include
arbitration clauses in their wills to help control redistribution under the guise of
undue influence); Kurt Wanless, Rethinking Oregon's Law of Undue Influence in
Will Contests, 76 OR. L. REV. 1027, 1035-38 (1997).
473. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1027 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "natural object
of testator's bounty" as whoever would take under the laws of intestacy). Since
intestacy laws depend on a definition of family based on blood, marriage or
adoption, bequests to non-relatives (committed partners or stepchildren) may be
seen as outside these "natural objects."
474. See, e.g., In re Will of Moses, 227 So. 2d 829 (Miss. 1969) (invalidating a
bequest from an older woman to her younger male lover); In re Kaufmann's Will,
247 N.Y.S.2d 664 (N.Y. App. Div. 1964), affd, 205 N.E.2d 864 (N.Y. 1965)
(invalidating a will leaving decedent's property to his "best friend," apparently his
homosexual partner).
475. See, e.g., In re Will of Moses, 227 So. 2d at 833 ('There was strong evidence
that this aging woman, seriously ill, disfigured by surgery, and hopelessly addicted
to alcoholic excesses, was completely bemused by the constant and amorous
attentions of Holland, a man 15 years her junior."). It seems unlikely that a court
would describe a marital relationship in this way.
476. See id.
477. See deFuria, supra note 472; Rhonda R. Rivera, Lawyers, Clients, and
AIDS: Some Notes from the Trenches, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 883, 892 (1989) (reporting
anecdotal evidence from lawyers that attacks by a decedent's biological family on
the decedent's homosexual partner are not uncommon and usually result in a
settlement that substantially reduces the share that the surviving partner
receives); Carol Angel, Legal Challenges to AIDS Patients' Wills Seen on Rise, L.A.
DAILY J., Aug. 16, 1988, at 1; Kirk Johnson, AIDS Victims' Wills Under Attack, N.Y.




The experience with undue influence suggests the need for
caution in approaching any uses of discretion in the probate
context.479 Discretion when a person dies intestate does, however,
present different issues from the use of discretion in testamentary
estates. A significant criticism of discretion in connection with
testate decedents-interference with testamentary freedom 480-
does not exist where the decedent has not exercised the
testamentary freedom. Further, if courts exercise discretion in a
way that favors societal norms,48 ' then permitting the exercise of
discretion to benefit non-traditional families will not likely move
the law far from the status quo. In fact, including non-traditional
families in intestacy statutes, even in a discretionary manner, may
decrease application of discretion in a manner that adversely
affects non-traditional families. Incorporating non-traditional
families into intestacy statutes will signal to the court the
importance of non-traditional families in American society.
The objective approach that predominates in intestacy
statutes carries with it the weight of history, the security of fixed
rules and the benefit of efficiency for the probate court.
Unfortunately, the objective "blood, marriage or adoption"
approach means that increasingly property does not benefit the
decedent's "family" nor follow decedent's intent. The difficulty, of
course, is that while ties through blood or adoption are relatively
easy to establish, ties of affinity are not. Any determination of
whether a decedent had a parent-child relationship with a
survivor will require some degree of discretion. The uncertainty
associated with the use of discretion likely will lead to increased
litigation. Discretion carries with it risks, but given the state of
today's families, some degree of discretion is necessary.
V. Proposal
American family life is complicated. A statute no longer can
create appropriate results for most testators if the statute provides
intestate shares only to those related to the decedent by blood or
adoption. Nevertheless, giving the probate court complete
478. See supra note 472.
479. See Harris, supra note 166, at 473 (pointing out that in determining
paternity bright-line rules may be less susceptible to manipulation and abuse by
decision-makers than when compared to indeterminate standards).
480. See supra text accompanying notes 468-471.
481. See Spitko, supra note 472, at 283 (explaining that "will contests enable the
fact-finder to rewrite the testator's estate plan in accordance with societal norms").
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discretion in determining intestate shares may also yield
inequitable results and will almost certainly yield uneven results.
The following proposal attempts to create an intestacy regime that
will have a reasonably predictable outcome for those who choose to
rely on the statute, that also will provide adequate direction to the
probate court, but that will be sufficiently flexible to account for
many of today's families. This proposal adopts a functional
approach in defining the parent-child relationship by adding a
functional definition to the existing formal definitions of parent
and child. The proposal is guided by two policies: (1) the
distribution should approximate the decedent's intent, and (2) the
intestacy statute should provide support 4 2 for families, however
formed.
This proposed intestacy statute adds an additional means for
a person to meet the definition of parent or child for purposes of
intestacy. The proposal, however, does not affect a state's existing
rules concerning issues such as paternity or adoption, but instead
is designed to add a new functional definition of parent and child
to a state's existing formal definitions. For example, if the UPC
adopted this provision as part of section 2-114, a child could
qualify for an intestate share as the decedent's biological child,48 3
an adopted child48 4 or a child for whom a parent-child relationship
is established.
The proposed statute48 5 treats as a child a person who the
court determines to be a child under a clear and convincing
evidence standard based on guidelines set out in the statute. This
determination will focus on the relationship between the parent
482. A policy of supporting the family means not only the economic spoils of the
decedent's estate, but also the psychological support that comes with being
recognized as a family member under the law. See Harris, supra note 166, at 474
("Recognition of more broadly defined families under an intestacy statute will help
strengthen family ties."). Engel suggests that many laws, including intestacy laws,
are detrimental to second marriages, stepparents and stepchildren. See Engel,
supra note 107, at 355 ('iTihe intestacy codes continue to ignore families in
remarriage situations, and the societal bias against stepfamilies and stepchildren
is encouraged in the laws."). Similarly, laws that discriminate against gay men,
lesbians and their children stigmatize their families and encourage private
discrimination against those families. See Spitko, supra note 28, at 1063-64.
483. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-114(a) (1993).
484. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-114(b) (1993).
485. The proposal incorporates into a state's intestacy statute new definitions for
child and parent. See infra Appendix I. Whether the child or parent inherit from
each other will depend upon other provisions of the intestacy statute and on the
existence of other heirs. Status as a child or parent may also give the person
standing to bring a will contest and may bring the person within family allowance
or family support provisions of the probate code. A legislature considering this
proposal should examine the extent of its effect on that state's probate laws.
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and child and will be based upon evidence that the relationship
was ongoing, familial and mutually significant. To reduce the
burdens on the court486 and to address concerns about judicial
discretion, the statute will include an evidentiary presumption
that a parent-child relationship existed. If factors establish this
presumption, an heir contesting the existence of a functional
parent-child relationship must produce clear and convincing
evidence to overcome the presumption.
A. Determination by the Court
The proposed statute includes a list of factors for use by the
probate court in determining whether a parent-child relationship
existed between the decedent and a survivor. The factors, and an
analysis or explanation of each, are as follows:
(1) The relationship between the parent and child began
during the child's minority. The younger the child, the greater the
weight to be given to this factor.
Although a relationship that begins during the child's
minority is more likely to be a parent-child relationship than one
that begins after the child becomes an adult,48 7 a meaningful
parent-child relationship can develop between adults. In addition,
if a family is formed when two stepchildren are minors and one
stepchild is eighteen, creating an intestate share for the two minor
children but not for the adult child without considering other
factors is too arbitrary. Since, however, a relationship between a
stepparent and a minor stepchild is more likely to develop into a
parent-child relationship than a relationship with an adult
stepchild, the age of the child when the relationship began should
be a factor. If the relationship began when the child was two years
old and continued throughout the child's minority, that
relationship is more likely to be a parent-child relationship than a
relationship that began at age seventeen or when the child was an
adult.
(2) The duration of the relationship was sufficient for the
formation of a parent-child bond.
Related to the first factor, this factor looks at the duration of
the relationship. A relationship that began when the stepchild
was seventeen and continued for twenty years, with a great deal of
486. See Harris, supra note 166, at 481 (noting that evidentiary presumptions
can reduce the costs associated with the indeterminacy of a functional definition of
a family relationship).
487. See Mahoney, supra note 195, at 930.
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interaction and perhaps caring for the stepparent by the stepchild
as the stepparent aged, may be a parent-child relationship that
should be recognized for intestacy purposes. In contrast, a
relationship that began only two years before the stepparent's
death may not have developed into a parent-child relationship,
particularly if the stepchild is an adult.
The statute does not require continuous contact between the
parent and the child; however, a long gap in the relationship could
suggest that a parent-child relationship did not exist. In
Stevenson,488 the decedent, Helen, had married James when his
children were approximately three and four years old.48 9 Helen
cared for the children for several years until she and James
separated. 490 For a period of some six or seven years the children
lived with James, but during that period they remained in contact
with Helen.491 James and Helen then began living together again,
and the children stayed in the care of Helen while James was on
military duty in Vietnam. 492 The court found that the thirty-five
year relationship between the stepchildren and Helen provided
evidence of a continuing relationship, despite the six or seven
years of limited contact.493 The court noted that a parent-child
relationship could continue even if the stepparent no longer lived
with the stepchildren due to divorce. 494 Even if the stepparent and
stepchildren lived apart for a lengthy period of time, other
evidence could show that a close relationship persisted. 495
488. See In re Estate of Stevenson, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 250 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).




493. See id. at 254 ("[E]ven if the relationship between the stepparent and child
does not flourish during the separation, the length of the time spent together may
outweigh the fact that the relationship was temporarily interrupted.").
494. See id.
495. See id. ('Given the frequency of separation and divorce, it makes sense to
recognize that relationships between stepparent and child may continue to flourish
even though the relationship between the stepparent and natural parent does
not."); cf. Brett R. Turner, Blended Families in the 1990s. Property Division Issues
Involving Nonmarital Children (1997), avialable in 1998 WL 9, 6 DIVORCE LITIG.
115, *122 ("The stepparent-stepchild relationship lasts only for the duration of the
marriage, and there is no policy basis upon which to impose a duty of future
support upon the stepparent.").
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(3) The decedent was married to or was a committed
partner496 of a biological or adoptive parent of the child.
Although the mere fact of the marriage of a child's biological
or adoptive parent to another person does not create a parent-child
relationship between the stepchild and the stepparent, the fact
that the parents have decided to formalize the creation of a family
should be considered as a factor.
The California statute and Mahoney's proposal both require
that the stepparent be married to the stepchild's legal parent.497
The statute proposed in this Article does not create such a
requirement. Although marriage of the parents is a factor that
should be given weight, in some families the parents cannot
legally marry because they are of the same sex and in other
families the parents choose not to marry.
As the court in Estate of Claffey498 noted, "the necessary
'relationship,'... must encompass something more than an
exchange of wedding vows between the legal father and a
stranger."499 Just as marriage of two adults does not necessarily
create a relationship between the stepparent and the stepchildren,
the lack of marriage does not necessarily indicate that no
relationship exists. In Stevenson, the court noted that the parties
agreed that the biological father and the stepmother had married,
although there was no evidence as to when-and presumably
whether-the two did marry.500  The children thought their
stepmother was their biological mother, and from the facts recited
would have thought so whether or not their parents had actually
married. 501
By not requiring marriage, the statute opens up the
possibility that a "parent" could be any person who spends a
496. The term "committed partner" as used in the statute relies on the definition
of de facto partner developed by Waggoner. If the statute does not incorporate the
definition of de facto or committed partner elsewhere in the intestacy provisions,
this section would have to include a definition of the term. See Waggoner, supra
note 3, at 79-80.
497. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 6454 (West 1991 & Supp. 1999); Mahoney, supra
note 195, at 929.
498. 257 Cal. Rptr. 197 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989). In Claffey, the stepchildren argued
that the California statute applied to them because their legal father had married
the decedent while they were minors. See id. at 198-99. The court found
insufficient evidence to establish a "family" relationship, in part because the
stepchildren had not lived with their legal father and the decedent. See id. at 200.
499. Id. at 199.





significant amount of time with the child-a grandparent or other
relative, a neighbor or even a hired caregiver. The statute must
provide sufficient guidance so that a parent under the statute is
truly a parent.
(4) The parent held the child out as his or her child, referring
to the child as his or her child or treating the child as his or her
child.
Evidence of the parent's treatment of the child can come from
statements of those who knew the family. In Stevenson, James'
brother Otis testified, "it was totally that she was proud of those
boys. I mean she treated them like her sons."50 2
(5) The parent provided economic and emotional support for
the child; the child provided economic and emotional support for
the parent.
This factor resembles the identification of a parent under the
in loco parentis doctrine. 503 A court could look to the application of
the in loco parentis doctrine in other contexts for assistance in
interpreting this factor. The court would consider evidence that
the parent provided financial support for the child or that the
parent acted as a psychological parent to the child. The court also
would look for evidence that a mutually close and loving
relationship existed between the parent and the child. Evidence
could show, for example, that the parent had been involved in the
day-to-day care of the child. If the child is an adult the court may
look for evidence that the child provided financial assistance or
emotional support for the parent. For example, evidence could
show monitoring of health care and frequent visits.
(6) Treatment of the child by the parent was comparable to the
decedent's treatment of his or her legal children.
Hanson notes that comparing a stepparent's treatment of a
stepchild with the same parent's treatment of a biological or
adoptive child is useful, particularly in determining whether a
parent-child relationship continued after the child became an
adult.50 4  Since the relationships between parents and their
children change after the children leave home, mere decline in
contact between a parent and a child does not necessarily indicate
the absence of a parent-child relationship. If the relationship of a
502. Id. at 255.
503. See supra text accompanying notes 289-300 (describing the in loco parentis
doctrine); see also supra text accompanying notes 432-434 (describing Mahoney's
proposal advocating the use of the in loco parentis doctrine in determining whether
a de facto family relationship existed).
504. See Hanson, supra note 438, at 276-79.
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stepparent and a stepchild continues to be comparable to that of
the stepparent with his or her biological or adoptive children, the
stepchild can use that evidence to show that the stepchild's
relationship with the stepparent was a parent-child
relationship. 5 5 Of course, not all stepparents have legal children,
so this factor will not be applicable in all situations.
(7) The decedent named the child or parent as a beneficiary to
receive property at the decedent's death through a nonprobate
transfer.
Nonprobate transfers contemplated here include: naming the
child or parent as a beneficiary under a pay-on-death or transfer-
on-death account; as a beneficiary on a life insurance policy; as a
beneficiary on an employee benefit plan; as a joint tenant with
right of survivorship on real property, bank accounts or stock
accounts owned by the decedent; or as a beneficiary under a trust
established by the decedent.
Increasingly, property is transferred at death by nonprobate
as well as probate means. 5° 6 If a decedent has provided for a child
or a parent through a nonprobate transfer, naming the child or the
parent as a beneficiary may indicate general donative intent. The
nonprobate transfers may provide the best evidence of what the
decedent would have provided if he or she had executed a will. On
the other hand, the decedent may have provided for the parent or
the child through a nonprobate transfer as a substitute gift-a gift
in lieu of a share of the probate estate. For example, a parent may
name a stepchild as the beneficiary of an insurance policy under
the assumption that the decedent's children, and not the stepchild,
will receive the probate assets. Evidence of the decedent's
treatment of his or her other children, if any, will be useful in
applying this factor, as will information concerning planning
associated with naming the beneficiaries of nonprobate assets.
B. Presumption
If a combination of factors exists, the factors will give rise to
a presumption that the relationship was a parent-child
relationship. The presumption can then be rebutted only by clear
and convincing evidence that the relationship was not functionally
that of a parent and a child. The presumption created by this
proposal requires the existence of two factors, plus proof of one of
the three additional factors. A parent-child relationship can
505. See id.
506. See WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 14, at 31-32.
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certainly exist even if these factors are absent, and the existence of
these factors does not mean that in every situation a parent-child
relationship existed. The presumption merely attempts to shift
the burden of proof at the appropriate point. This proposal, and
particularly the presumption, is a starting point for discussion
since it may be criticized for being overbroad in the number of
families that it includes. Yet, if the purposes of the statute include
support for families, as well as approximating the intent of the
decedent, an inclusive statute may be appropriate.
A presumption that a parent-child relationship existed will
arise if the following factors exist:
(1) The parent and the child lived in the same household for:
(a) periods totalling at least five years during the six years
preceding the decedent's death or (b) periods totalling twelve years.
Although the length of time the parent and the child lived
together is not determinative of the quality of their relationship,
the longer they lived together the more likely it is that a functional
parent-child relationship existed. The difficulty with requiring
that the parent and the child live in the same household at the
time of the decedent's death is that most children, regardless of
whether they are legally or functionally related to their parents,
leave home when they reach adulthood. The presumption,
therefore, requires a longer period of time if the parent and the
child no longer live together because the likelihood that a
relationship will continue throughout the joint lives of the two
persons increases if they lived in the same household for a long
period of time, presumably while the child was growing up.
(2) The. relationship between the parent and the child began
when the child was a minor.
Although it is not necessary for a finding by the court that a
functional relationship existed, for purposes of the presumption it
is appropriate to require that the relationship began when the
child was a minor. This requirement is also part of both the
California statute and the Mahoney proposal.507
(3) One of the following factors:
(a) The decedent named the child or the parent as a
beneficiary to receive property at the decedent's death through a
nonprobate transfer, including naming the child or the parent as a
beneficiary under a pay-on-death or transfer-on-death account, as a
beneficiary on a life insurance policy, as a beneficiary on an
507. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 6454 (West 1991 & Supp. 1999); Mahoney, supra
note 195, at 930.
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employee benefit plan, as a joint tenant with right of survivorship
on real property, bank accounts, or stock accounts owned by the
decedent, or as a beneficiary under a trust established by the
decedent.
As described above, providing for a child or a parent by
nonprobate means provides strong evidence that a parent-child
relationship existed. A presumption based on this factor could be
rebutted by evidence that the decedent had named the beneficiary
to receive a nonprobate asset because the decedent expected that
the beneficiary would not receive a probate distribution.
(b) The decedent was married to or was a committed partner
of a biological or adoptive parent of the child.
Marriage between the decedent and the child's legal parent is
a factor making existence of a parent-child relationship more
likely. The California statute and the Mahoney proposal make
this a requirement. 50 8 The factor, expanded to include committed
partners as determined under the probate statute, is sufficiently
strong to warrant its use in creating a presumption under the
proposed statute.
(c) A court determined in another proceeding that the parent
had acted in loco parentis with the child.
The finding of an in loco parentis relationship is at the heart
of the functional definition of parent and child. If another court
has already made a determination, albeit for different purposes,
that a person was acting in loco parentis, then that determination
can serve to create a presumption for intestacy purposes. This
proposal does not include a restriction on when the prior court
proceeding occurred, permitting the use of a finding made years
before the decedent's death. If the finding occurred thereby many
years before the decedent's death, and thereafter the relationship
ceased to function as a parent-child relationship, then evidence
that the relationship had changed can be used to rebut the
presumption.
If a presumption exists, then another heir of the decedent can
challenge the existence of a parent-child relationship by
presenting contrary evidence. The other heir could show, for
example, that the child's legal parent and the decedent did not
commingle their finances and that the decedent did not provide
financial support for the child. The other heir could also provide
evidence that the decedent did not treat the child as his or her
508. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 6454 (West 1991 & Supp. 1999); Mahoney, supra
note 195, at 930.
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child and did not refer to the child as his or her child, or that the
decedent treated the child differently from the way the decedent
treated his or her legal children. Evidence to rebut the
presumption would go to the question of how the parent and the
child interacted, focusing on whether they acted functionally as
parent and child.
Conclusion
The form of American families has changed and will continue
to change. What remains constant is the function families perform
for their members and for society. Families create caring,
nurturing and loving relationships that do not depend on formal
requirements that the family members be related by blood, legal
marriage or adoption to be considered family. The law in some
areas has begun to recognize new families, but intestacy law lags
behind. The Hawaii statute and the California stepchild provision
are important steps, but are limited in their scope. Intestacy laws
should encompass the children of the new families such as
stepchildren, children of gay and lesbian families, and children in
families headed by opposite-sex, unmarried partners.
This Article proposes statutory changes that, particularly if
combined with Waggoner's proposal creating an intestate share for
de facto partners, could begin to make intestacy statutes more
inclusive and more useful. Intestacy laws should approximate the
intent of the decedent and provide support, both economic and
psychological, for all families. It is hoped that this Article, and the





Section [Insert Appropriate Number]
Parent and Child Relationship
[To be added to the existing section describing the parent and
child relationship. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-114 (1993)].
(a) For purposes of intestate succession, an individual is the
child of another individual and an individual is the parent of
another individual if the person seeking to establish the
relationship proves by clear and convincing evidence that a
parent-child relationship existed between the two individuals at
the time of the decedent's death. This section shall not create
inheritance rights for any person other than the individuals for
whom a parent-child relationship is established pursuant to this
section.
(b) [Factors.] Although no single factor or set of factors
determines whether a relationship qualifies as a parent-child
relationship, the following factors are among those to be
considered as positive indications that a parent-child relationship
existed:
(1) The relationship between the parent and child began
during the child's minority. The younger the child, the greater the
weight to be given to this factor;
(2) The duration of the relationship was sufficient for the
formation of a parent-child bond;
(3) The decedent was married to or was a committed partner
of a biological or adoptive parent of the child;
(4) The parent held the child out as his or her child, referring
to the child as his or her child or treating the child as his or her
child;
(5) The parent provided economic and emotional support for
the child; the child provided economic and emotional support for
the parent;
(6) Treatment of the child by the parent was comparable to
the parent's treatment of his or her legal children; and
(7) The decedent named the child or parent as a beneficiary
to receive property at the decedent's death through a nonprobate
transfer.
(c) [Presumption.] An individual's relationship with the
decedent is presumed to have been a parent-child relationship if:
(1) The parent and the child lived in the same household for:
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(i) periods totaling at least five years during the six years
preceding the decedent's death or (ii) periods totaling twelve years;
(2) The relationship between the parent and the child began
when the child was a minor; and
(3) One of the following factors:
(i) The decedent named the child or parent as a beneficiary
under a pay-on-death or transfer-on-death account, as a
beneficiary on a life insurance policy, as a beneficiary on an
employee benefit plan, as a joint tenant with right of survivorship
on real property, bank accounts, or stock accounts owned by the
decedent, or as a beneficiary under a trust established by the
decedent;
(ii) The decedent was married to or was a committed partner
of a biological or adoptive parent of the child; or
(iii) A court determined in another proceeding that the parent
had acted in loco parentis with the child.
(d) [Force of the presumption.] If a presumption arises
under subsection (c), the presumption is rebuttable only by clear
and convincing evidence.
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